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One of the significant transformations in the 
political economy of rural Nepal is the gradual 
weakening of traditional forms of attached and 
caste-based division of labor. Not only has there 
been a diversification of rural livelihoods from 
land- and agriculture-based to non-agricultural- 
and non-land-based sources, there is also a 
growing and widespread mobility of labor 
within and outside the country. Mobility ranges 
from commuting for day labor to nearby areas 
and seasonal mobility to towns and cities or 
across the border to India, to organized 
migration to the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and 
beyond. Mobility of labor has become a 
significant and increasing part of the rural 
political economy. The existing debates on 
migration in Nepal are largely limited to labor 
migration to international destinations, ignoring 
the significance of the largest number of 
migrants, who move internally or across the 
border to India. These debates are dominated 
either by discourses on remittances or portrayal 
of these migrants as voiceless victims. This 
research captures the social meanings associated 
with migration experiences amongst the poorer 
sections of the population and considers both 
internal and international labor migration. The 
main aim of this research is to document social 
suffering among migrants and locate their 
experiences in the wider context of social 
transformation in Nepal. We conducted in-depth 
interviews with the subjects themselves and a 
range of other stakeholders, such as manpower/
recruitment agencies and trade union 
representatives, and by using participant 
observation in different settings including cities 
like Kathmandu (looking at brick kilns and the 
service, manufacturing, and construction 
sectors), towns and rural areas in Nepal (looking 
at the service and construction sectors), India 
(domestic work, service sector, etc.), the Gulf 
States (construction, agriculture, and service 
sectors) and other specific sites where various 
forms of exploitative, bonded labor and 
trafficking practices are widespread. Through 
these in-depth interviews, we were able to 
document and explain the nature and practices 
of labor from the perspective of vulnerability and 
livelihoods. 
This research argues that while the discussion on 
migration, remittances, and their impact on 
poverty alleviation is very important for Nepal’s 
development, we cannot ignore the exploitative 
conditions under which such gains are made and 
the suffering of migrant workers that is visible in 
terms of despair, bodily harm, discrimination, 
and death. Building on our earlier research, we 
argue that mobility of labor has not necessarily 
meant more freedom for poorer migrants, 
although the idea of freedom appears to be 
driving much of the out-migration from rural 
Nepal. Further, mobility and wage labor have 
led to contradictory class mobility; i.e., while 
migration has certainly opened up opportunities 
for cash income, the nature of work and working 
conditions have often resulted in social 
dislocation, humiliation, debt entrapment, social 
suffering, and structural violence. Migrants’ 
mobility highlights an apparent contradiction 
and their liminal position: they leave the villages 
because of their redundancy in the rural-agrarian 
labor processes as well as because of the 
attraction that modernity has to offer in the cities 
and towns, but they are constantly driven back 
to their village because of the transient and 
time-bound nature of their mobility. One of the 
paradoxes of Nepali migration amongst the 
poorer population is that the identity of the 
migrant remains attached to the village even if 
the working sites and sectors are “modern” and 
urban. For marginal migrants, the circulatory 
nature of migration does not appear to be as 
transformative as might have been expected: 
while life in the destination may well be urban 
and modern, their identity remains rural, or at 
best “rurban.” Our findings indicate that despite 
known risks, a large number of migrants appear 
to “consent” to work in exploitative working 
conditions. 
ABSTRACT
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I. INTRODUCTION
  As we entered a brick kiln, located just off the main 
highway going out of Kathmandu some 30 minutes 
from the city, one of the first things we saw was the 
smoke coming out of a chimney, small huts made 
with bricks, stacks of bricks, both raw and cooked, 
and a large number of people moving around, doing 
different things. As we approached, two boys aged 
10–12 were mixing the mud and making dough, 
another young girl aged around 12 was drying the 
bricks and counting them. Three young children of 
about 2–3 years old were playing around in the same 
area. The next day was a day off in the kiln and the 
boys were not there but we met a man who was 
making dough next to where the two boys had been 
working. When asked why he was working on a day 
off, he replied that he does not take days off. The 
man was 44 years old but looked to us about 60. 
He was skinny, looked malnourished and extremely 
fatigued. He had a 15-month-old baby and wife 
with him. The three of them lived in a small hut, 
made up of raw bricks, next to where he was 
working. As he was making dough, he was sweating. 
The work he was doing was not necessarily skilled, 
and seemed very much like working in agricultural 
field. Both he and his wife make bricks, and his wife 
works to dry them and stack them. Apart from 
making bricks, he also carries bricks to the kiln to 
earn more money. Before coming to work in the brick 
kiln in Kathmandu, he used to work in Pokhara, 
carrying and loading sand for construction. Although 
he was able to earn more money in his previous 
work, he came to work in the kiln because the family 
can live and work together as a production unit. Both 
he and his wife get work, and the work is on a piece 
basis so there is no wage difference for men and 
women. In our conversation we learned that a couple 
may make 1,500–2,000 bricks per day, i.e., around 
10,000 bricks per week, which earns around 7,000 
rupees per week but only if they work every single 
day from morning to evening. By living together and 
working together as a family, they can make more 
money and look after their children while working, 
which is not possible in other work settings. 
(Fieldnotes, Sharma, Kathmandu, May 2012)
  During our fieldwork in Delhi, we went to meet 
migrants working (and living) in a momo (dumpling) 
restaurant, which was located inside a small dark 
lane close to an elite neighborhood. It was around 9 
am in the morning, and it had not opened for 
business. The takeaway restaurant was located on 
the ground floor of the building and it served momos, 
noodles, and other similar items. There were a couple 
of rented rooms on the second floor of the building 
where the workers, all of them from mid-western 
Nepal, lived and worked. The owner, who was also 
a Nepali from the same region, had been bringing 
workers from the same area since he began his 
business about 12 years ago. As we climbed the stairs 
and made it to the second floor, there were three 
young boys chopping onions and cabbage in large 
quantities to prepare momos in a very dark, wet, and 
humid room, and one of them was washing the 
cooking utensils from the previous day. It was 
extremely hot with no ventilation, and the boys were 
sweating. On the left side was a room with several 
beds on the floor, covered by unarranged bed sheets. 
These boys worked and lived there, and mostly there 
was no life beyond working in this kitchen for them 
except for the occasional trip to the nearby shop to 
purchase onions, vegetables, and other grocery items, 
or to watch films once in a while. These boys worked 
for long hours, started to work as early as 7am in the 
morning and continued to work till 11pm or 12am, 
and there was no weekend or time off for them. 
They woke up in the morning, cleaned the kitchen, 
washed all the utensils, brought large quantities of 
vegetables and other supplies from a wholesale shop, 
did all the preparatory work including chopping and 
making momos, and 1–2 of them delivered the 
cooked meals to different stalls and homes in the 
neighborhood. Those who went for home delivery 
bathed, and wore a clean t-shirt and a cap. These 
boys earned about INRs (Indian rupees) 2,500–
3,000 per month. (Fieldnotes, Sharma, New 
Delhi, April 2012)
  In a run-down area of downtown Doha—a 
neighborhood that will be demolished to make place 
for the gleaming new city that will host the Soccer 
World Cup in 2022—we visited three young 
(18–20-year-old) migrants from the Langtang area 
who were camping on the roof of a derelict hostel for 
migrant workers. They had arrived in Qatar two 
months earlier and found that their working 
conditions, salary, and accommodation were not what 
they had been promised. They had protested, and 
their sponsor had thrown them out on the street with 
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no salary, no exit permit, and no passport. They 
had been surviving thanks to canned food and other 
items provided by an unofficial Nepali self-help 
group and some foreign benefactors. They had no 
money (and had taken out large loans from 
moneylenders in their village) and no way of leaving 
Qatar. The Nepali embassy had been approached 
but seemed ineffective in addressing the case. They 
were stuck. Getting exit papers was going to take 
time. They were dirty, tired, depressed, and 
hopeless. When asked what would happen when, 
eventually, they would make their way back to 
Nepal, they said that in addition to the loss of face of 
having been unsuccessful in their migration attempt, 
they would somehow have to pay back 120,000 to 
160,000 NPRs (Nepali rupees) each. The only 
solution would be for their family to sell whatever 
land they still had. (Fieldnotes, Donini, Doha, 
December 2012)
  I went towards molders’ hut where a few women and 
children were resting outside. They were expecting to 
go home either tomorrow or the day after, and 
worried whether their accounts would be settled 
today. I began to talk to the contractor’s wife, who 
got married about a year ago. It was her first 
experience working in the kiln. She had known 
about her husband’s work in the kiln but said, “I 
never knew that it would be so tough.” She said, 
“This tough labor will decrease one’s life by four 
years.” If she can, she will never come again to make 
bricks although she is not sure whether her husband 
can leave this work. She said, “It is like 24 hours’ 
work here, we start making bricks from 1am till 
5–6am in the morning, drying them during the day, 
stacking in a row in the evening and then mixing 
clay for the next day. You won’t be free anytime 
either in the day or in the night.” They used to have 
a day off every ninth day. She is also pregnant and 
couldn’t get any rest. But she says that she can get 
money from her husband for her expenses. As we 
were talking, her husband came and scolded her for 
sitting and talking to me, saying, “Talai hakimni 
bannuparne?” (literally, “Are you the manager 
here?”) He ordered her to go to their hut and bring 
the sacho (brick making mold), buckets, and other 
things to return to the owner. She just stood up and 
headed towards her hut. Her husband didn’t like 
that her wife talked to me. I explained to him about 
the purpose of the visit. He said, “Who works 
makes good money and who cannot work won’t 
make money” and left the scene. (Fieldnotes, 
Sanjaya, Lalitpur, May 2012)
Our report starts with these four instances of 
social suffering that we encountered in our 
fieldwork on the experiences of Nepali migrant 
workers. Although the current debate on labor 
migration is dominated by the issue of 
remittances and their developmental impact, our 
aim in this research is to document social 
suffering among different types of migrants and 
locate their experiences in the wider context of 
social transformation in Nepal. While the 
discussion on migration and its impact on 
poverty alleviation and development is very 
important, we cannot ignore the exploitative 
conditions under which such gains are made and 
the visible suffering of migrant workers in terms 
of despair, bodily harm, discrimination, and 
death.
Before we proceed further we should clarify 
what this report is about. Our research is about 
the experiences of marginal migrants, both 
within Nepal and internationally, with a focus 
on structural violence and social suffering during 
recruitment as well as in the work processes. Our 
goal is not to say that migrants are just victims of 
exploitation, but to highlight some of the critical 
issues that often go missing in the discussion on 
mobility of labor, which has been dominated by 
either discourses around remittances or the 
portrayal of migrants as voiceless victims. This 
research has a limited scope and does not intend 
to offer a comprehensive understanding of all 
aspects of the migration experience in Nepal.  
Our approach is to treat all the forms of mobility 
under the same framework rather than treating 
internal and international migration as distinct 
analytical domains. Our focus is on the decisions 
migrants make and the choices available to them 
that result in migration to different destinations, 
both within and outside Nepal. Treating 
different forms of migration with the same 
analytical lens helps us to understand better the 
choices migrants make not only on whether to 
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migrate or not, but more importantly on where 
to migrate based on the information and 
different forms of capital (i.e., social, economic, 
or cultural) they acquire and that are accessible 
to them. In our research, we found that 
individual migrants often moved to several 
destinations, both internally and outside of 
Nepal, in search of work opportunities and 
livelihoods. 
As our previous research has highlighted,1 one of 
the significant transformations in the political 
economy of rural Nepal is the gradual 
weakening of traditional forms of attached and 
caste-based division of labor. Not only have we 
seen the diversification of rural livelihoods from 
land- and agriculture-based to non-agricultural- 
and non-land-based sources, there is also 
widespread mobility of labor within and outside 
the country. Mobility ranges from commuting 
for day labor from the village to nearby areas and 
seasonal mobility to cities or across the border to 
India, to organized migration to the Gulf and 
beyond. Overall, mobility has resulted in massive 
processes of commodification of labor. Whether 
working as construction workers, in brick kilns, 
or as domestic workers or migrant workers in 
India or in other global destinations such as the 
Gulf States and Malaysia, rural men, and an 
increasing number of women, are out-migrating 
to sectors of the economy that operate outside 
the rural and agrarian sectors. For most, the 
choice is not about whether to migrate or not, 
but it is about where to migrate. We explore 
questions such as: What does “mobility” mean 
for the laboring population? What is the 
experience of migration—both for those who 
leave and those who stay behind? Despite known 
risks, what drives labor migration to different 
destinations—why do people continue to 
provide “consent” for their own exploitation or 
social suffering?
Our research is based on extensive fieldwork in 
rural areas of out-migration and in urban areas of 
in-migration in Kathmandu, New Delhi, and 
Qatar. Using the analytical framework of 
structural violence, symbolic violence, and social 
suffering, our research explores the experiences 
of laboring populations from rural Nepal whose 
desire for freedom and a better life in new sectors 
of employment, in urban areas or abroad, has 
been met with social suffering and exploitation. 
We found that although the shift from “fields” to 
“cities” does indicate a change in the position of 
the laboring population from “subjects” to 
“citizens,” the movement away from the rural 
and agrarian sectors, where caste-based and other 
forms of structural and symbolic violence are 
believed to be embedded, has not itself been free 
of structural violence and social suffering. This 
movement has not been from “unfreedom” to 
“freedom.” Although the idea of freedom 
appears to be driving much of the out-migration 
from rural Nepal, mobility and wage labor often 
lead to contradictory class mobility; i.e., while 
migration has certainly opened up opportunities 
for cash income, the nature of the work and the 
working conditions have often resulted in social 
dislocation, humiliation, debt entrapment, social 
suffering, and structural violence. In many ways, 
one could argue that the structural violence and 
social suffering that migrants experience in the 
destination is just an extension of what they 
aspire to escape from in rural villages of Nepal. 
The paradox is that young migrants escape from 
semi-feudal or bonded conditions in the village 
and then find themselves in equally exploitative, 
if not semi-feudal, working conditions in the 
migratory process and in the destination.
The informal sector, where migrants mainly 
work, offers very little social or legal protection. 
Migrants are the victims of various forms of 
exploitative structures both in the procedures of 
organizing the migration and in the workplace. 
Although experiences and working conditions 
vary, most migrants work in the informal sector, 
which remains under-monitored, under-
regulated, casualized, and without access to any 
official social protection whatsoever. Officially 
sanctioned migration to the Gulf or other 
countries is highly organized but equally 
exploitative. It relies on informal networks of 
agents and brokers at the village level that are 
often based on family/kinship relationships. 
These networks are connected to globalized and 
government-sanctioned organizations that 
1   J. R. Sharma, and A. Donini, 2012, “From Subjects to Citizens? Labor, Mobility and Social Transformation in Rural Nepal,” Feinstein 
International Center, Tufts University, http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/2012/from-subjects-to-citizens.
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manage large numbers of migrants to fulfill the 
quotas agreed through bilateral agreements 
between the Nepali state and the recipient 
country. 
Purpose of the Study
The primary objective of the study was to 
document, understand, and explain the changing 
forms of labor in post-conflict Nepal. We were 
particularly interested in understanding the 
drivers of bonded and other modern forms of 
“unfree” labor in various sectors of work and 
employment and how these are influenced by 
wider processes of social transformation that are 
shaping Nepali society, politics, and the 
economy. The study was composed of two 
distinct phases. Our 2012 research on changing 
forms of labor exploitation (Phase I) analyzed 
changing practices at the village and local level 
from the perspective of individuals and 
communities at the lower end of the socio-
economic scale and the decisions they make to 
improve their human condition. The current 
report (Phase II) takes the analysis of the political 
economy of vulnerability among the laboring 
population to the experience of mobility at the 
national and international levels. Building on the 
earlier findings, this report focuses on the 
findings of Phase II. Both phases were financed 
by a generous grant from Humanity United.
We look for similarities and differences between 
“old” and “new” forms of labor, with a 
particular emphasis on work processes and the 
recruitment of labor, and how these processes 
shape the lives and livelihoods of the laboring 
population, which includes Dalits and other 
impoverished caste and ethnic groups. We pay 
particular attention to the social, economic, and 
other pressures that affect the decision-making 
and organization of laborers, with an aim to 
understanding why some people end up in 
exploitative relations/conditions, and others do 
not.  
We distinguish between forms of exploitative 
labor as they existed in traditional Nepali rural 
society and contemporary forms of labor in 
various branches of the economy (e.g., service, 
construction, manufacturing sectors, etc). Our 
approach is not to treat bonded and other forms 
of unfree labor arrangements as separate from a 
broader analysis related to the whole landscape of 
employment of Nepalis in and outside the 
country, including the experience of Nepali 
migrants and those trafficked to India and the 
Gulf States. On the basis of earlier work in this 
field and the findings of our own research, we 
can safely affirm that the emergence of new 
forms of labor exploitation is strongly connected 
to the intensification of both external and 
internal migration, and to the increased 
monetization of commodity exchanges and of 
social relationships. 
Key Research Questions
By focussing on the experiences of poorer 
migrants, the research aims to identify and 
explain the range of “exploitative” forms of labor 
that are prevalent in Nepal and in the experience 
of migration: 
	 •	 	What	is	the	nature	of	changes	in	labor	
practices in contemporary Nepal? How 
might we explain the changes in labor 
practices, and their meanings for the 
individuals concerned?
	 •	 	To	what	extent	have	labor	practices	shifted	
from “feudal relations” in rural and 
agricultural settings (including bonded 
laborers) to market-mediated “class” relations 
in urban, non-agricultural, and out-
migration settings, and has this process 
reduced the vulnerabilities of the rural poor?
	 •	 	How	has	migration,	both	external	and	
internal, contributed to the transition from 
“feudal” to “commodified” labor practices?
	 •	 	What	do	different	types	of	“mobility”	mean	
for the laboring population? What is the 
subjective experience of migration?
	 •	 	Despite	known	risks,	what	drives	labor	
migration to different destinations—why do 
people continue to provide “consent” for 
their own exploitation or social suffering?
Our starting assumption, based on a review of 
the literature, as well as our own earlier work on 
perceptions of change,2 is that (rural) Nepal is on 
2   J. R. Sharma, and A. Donini, 2012, “From Subjects to Citizens? Labor, Mobility and Social Transformation in Rural Nepal,” Feinstein 
International Center, Tufts University, http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/2012/from-subjects-to-citizens.
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the cusp of a major “transformation” from a 
relatively stable condition of reproduction of 
social and economic relations based on feudal 
and caste strictures to a more fluid and open 
condition where the old “order” is changing, if 
not collapsing, and a new order or disorder is 
emerging. Individuals and their livelihoods, 
even in the most remote areas, are increasingly 
affected by variables such as cash-based 
employment, the circulation of labor, the 
incorporation of the rural economy into 
globalized flows, and the commodification of 
labor and land, to name but a few.  
While there is anecdotal evidence of the 
transformations highlighted above, there have 
as yet been no field-based studies of the impact 
of such changes for the overall vulnerabilities of 
the rural and urban poor as well as on caste, 
gender, and other forms of discrimination. In 
this sense, our research aims to open new and 
important ground. Although some of the 
big-picture issues affecting life in rural areas are 
known—for example, the massive increase in 
external migration and remittances (with about 
10 percent of the Nepali population outside the 
country at any given time), the emergence of a 
cash economy and cash crops, advances in 
education, access to health, transport, and 
communications—our understanding of who 
are the winners and losers and of the livelihoods 
strategies employed by individuals and 
communities is very sketchy at best. 
 
By looking at the changes in labor arrangements 
(Phase I) and extending the research to internal 
and international migration (Phase II), our field 
research captures the perceptions of changes of 
those involved and the meanings ascribed to 
these changes. Our research provides a view 
from below that allows for a better 
understanding and conceptualization of 
ongoing transformations in Nepali society and 
the risks and opportunities that vulnerable 
groups are facing in this process. 
Conceptual Framework
We will now briefly discuss five different 
concepts (mobility, livelihoods, social 
transformation, structural violence, and 
symbolic violence) as a means to explore the 
research questions discussed above. We bring 
together our fieldwork-based empirical 
evidence and these concepts to address the 
research questions. 
Mobility: Following Sharma,3 we find that it is 
helpful to move beyond the existing categories 
of migration if we are to capture different forms 
of mobility decisions from the perspective of 
aspiring migrants. Existing literature deals with 
different forms of mobility separately. It is either 
characterized by the length of time involved 
(seasonal, cyclical, permanent, temporary), or in 
terms of distance (internal, international), or in 
terms of spatial direction (rural-urban, urban-
rural, rural-rural), or in terms of motivation 
(voluntary, forced), or in terms of history 
(pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial) and so 
on. Treating migration within these categories 
offers little possibility to examine different 
migration choices available to migrants from 
different backgrounds. Further, considering 
mobility as a frame of reference allows us to 
examine the questions of exploitation, freedom, 
structural violence, and suffering across 
different forms of mobility. We maintain that 
the concept of mobility enables us to explore 
the commonality and differences in these, and 
see how these different forms of mobility and 
associated processes of suffering are connected 
to each other. Understanding mobility from 
people’s perspective allows one to explore a 
more complex picture than what is often taken 
for granted as the clear and defined categories 
of migration. Above all, treating different forms 
of mobility under a single framework opens an 
opportunity to uncover political agendas in the 
existing authoritative discourses that a priori 
conceptualize some forms of mobility as better 
than others. 
Livelihoods: At the broader level, we are 
interested in livelihoods, and how people’s 
livelihoods in Nepal are shaped by wider social 
transformation. For the purpose of this work 
we adopt a simple definition of livelihoods—
“diverse ways in which people make a living 
3   J. R. Sharma, 2007, “Mobility, Pathology and Livelihoods: An Ethnography of Forms of Mobility in/from Nepal,” Graduate School of 
Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh.
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and build their worlds.”4 It is both about 
fulfilling biological needs but also about giving 
meaning to their existence. The search for 
income or other means through which people 
can access resources to sustain themselves and 
their families is a major factor in how people 
structure their lives and make the decision of 
whether to move or not and, more importantly, 
where to move. We view mobility as a part of 
people’s livelihoods, exploring how their 
mobility decisions are shaped not only by 
socio-economic but also by socio-cultural 
factors, including familial and gender 
considerations. 
Social Transformation: We maintain that 
people’s livelihoods are not of their own making 
but are shaped by wider forces of social 
transformation. Following our research program, 
we are primarily interested in how social 
transformation in Nepali society is viewed by the 
people, and whether or not such social 
transformation has had an impact on the 
livelihoods of laboring populations beyond the 
rhetoric of change. We find that the vectors of 
change that Polanyi5 applied to his analysis of the 
“Great Transformation” that accompanied the 
industrial revolution in Europe provide a useful 
frame to understand social change in Nepal. 
These vectors of change are the commodification 
of land, labor, and money. In rural Nepal, land 
was where people worked, and labor was what 
they did. Bonded or exchange-based forms of 
labor were how one eked out a livelihood, rather 
than through cash transactions. Now, even 
remote areas of rural Nepal have witnessed a 
change from a relatively static situation of 
reproduction of societal roles to one where land 
and labor are increasingly bought and sold and 
where the market economy and globalized 
economic and social processes (communications, 
migration, social remittances, outlook on the 
“outside”) have rapidly taken hold. 
Structural violence: We have consistently 
employed the concept of structural violence in 
our research work to characterize conditions of 
structural inequalities in Nepali society that 
result in the systematic exclusion and 
marginalization of some populations based on 
their caste, ethnicity, and other forms of 
identity. According to Farmer, structural 
violence refers to systematic ways in which 
social structures disadvantage individuals. 
Structural violence is subtle and often has no 
one specific person who can (or will) be held 
responsible for it. Farmer defines it as “violence 
exerted systematically—that is indirectly—by 
everyone who belongs to a certain social 
order.”6 The system of social and institutional 
oppression functions as long as each side, 
oppressor and oppressed, play their roles 
according to the rules implanting social 
suffering and subordination of one to the other. 
Galtung, another scholar who frequently used 
the term “structural violence” in relation to 
conflict studies, defines it as “the indirect 
violence built into repressive social orders 
[which] creates enormous differences between 
potential and actual human self-realization.”7 
Symbolic violence: We draw on the notion of 
symbolic violence from Pierre Bourdieu to 
allow us to talk about various modes of socio-
cultural violence. He uses the concept of 
symbolic violence to designate symbolic power 
exercised by the dominant over the other.8 
Symbolic violence is the unnoticed or 
naturalized domination that everyday social 
practice maintains over the conscious subject. 
One of the key features of the concept is that 
those who are subjected to symbolic violence 
are not passive recipients who accept their 
subjugation as given but are actually complicit 
in their subjugation. For this reason, the 
dominated internalize and naturalize 
domination and do not question or resist it. 
4   A. Bebbington, 1999, “Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and Poverty,” World 
Development 27 (12): 2021–2044, p. 2034.
5   Karl Polanyi, 2001, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press.
6   P. Farmer, 2004, “An Anthropology of Structural Violence,” Current Anthropology 45 (3): 305–325, p. 307.
7   J. Galtung, 1975, Peace: Research, Education, Action. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers. p. 173.
8   P. Bourdieu, 2001, Masculine Domination, Cambridge: Polity Press.
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Research Design and Methodology
Our field research first explored the nature of 
labor arrangements, organization, and relations 
with a specific focus on rural households and 
mobility in six different sites in Nepal (see Phase 
I report). We then built on this study by 
conducting fieldwork not only in rural Nepal but 
also following migrants and “trafficked” 
individuals both within Nepal and to two 
destinations outside Nepal (India and Qatar). In 
addition, we interviewed prospective migrants to 
understand the complex arrangements that link 
the village to the manpower/recruitment 
agencies and state-sponsored migration processes. 
As well, we interviewed aspiring and returning 
migrants to gain a perspective on their 
experience. 
By conducting in-depth interviews with the 
subjects themselves and a range of other 
stakeholders, such as manpower/recruitment 
agencies and trade union representatives, and by 
using participant observation in different settings 
including cities like Kathmandu (looking at 
brick kilns, and service, manufacturing, and 
construction sectors), towns and rural areas in 
Nepal (looking at the service and construction 
sector), India (domestic work, service sector, etc.) 
and the Gulf States (construction, agriculture, 
and service sectors), and other specific sites 
where various forms of exploitative, bonded 
labor and trafficking practices are widespread, we 
document, understand, and explain the nature 
and practices of labor from the perspective of 
vulnerability and livelihoods. We analyze the 
interplay of class, caste, gender, and kinship 
networks within the ways the workforce is 
recruited, deployed, and disciplined. The tables 
in the Annexes provide details of the fieldwork 
sites and interviewees.
The methodology remained the same as for our 
earlier research. We have privileged open, 
one-to-one discussions, where the conversation 
was allowed to evolve organically, over 
structured interviews and focus groups. We have 
found that by conducting in-depth interviews 
with the subjects themselves and a range of other 
stakeholders, and by using participant 
observation in different settings including cities 
like Kathmandu, rural areas in Nepal, and other 
specific work sites such as New Delhi and Qatar 
where various forms of exploitative, bonded 
labor and trafficking practices are widespread, we 
were able to collect rich data that help us to 
understand and explain the nature and practices 
of labor and migration from the perspective of 
the vulnerability and livelihoods of those 
concerned. Where feasible, we focused on 
getting “thick” descriptions of working and 
living conditions of migrant workers through 
close observation, in-depth interviews, and 
interaction with migrants.
Management and Organization
The research was managed by Jeevan Sharma 
(Centre for South Asian Studies and Department 
of Social Anthropology, University of 
Edinburgh) and Antonio Donini (Feinstein 
International Center, Tufts University), and was 
a collaborative venture between the two 
Universities. They were assisted by a team of 
locally recruited researchers who worked under 
the oversight and management of the Principal 
Investigators: Sanjaya Aryal, Keshav Bashyal, and 
Muna Gautam did the bulk of the fieldwork. 
Antonio and Jeevan accompanied Sanjaya for the 
initial fieldwork in the Kathmandu valley and in 
Sindupalchowk. Antonio and Sanjaya did the 
interviewing in Qatar, while Jeevan 
accompanied Keshav for fieldwork in New Delhi 
and Sanjaya for initial fieldwork in Kathmandu. 
Sanjaya also played a key role in the write-up 
and analysis of the field-generated material. 
Throughout the fieldwork phase, the 
investigators held teleconferences with all 
members of the research team, to share 
information, discuss processes, and address 
concerns. Running tallies of interviews 
completed were shared regularly via email, 
enabling investigators to monitor progress 
towards completion of the data collection for the 
project as a whole. Two workshops were held 
with the Principal Investigators and the research 
team to compare notes and identify key trends 
and gaps in the data.
Throughout the project duration, contact was 
maintained and collaborative approaches sought 
with Nepali-based institutions working on social 
transformation issues, in particular with the 
Social Science Baha and Nepali academics. The 
work and accumulated experience of NGOs 
dealing with caste, gender, and other forms of 
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discrimination was also tapped. Seminars and 
presentations on emerging issues and the findings 
of the research were held in Kathmandu, 
Edinburgh, and Geneva and provided 
opportunities for cross-fertilization between our 
research and the work of other research 
institutions and civil society organizations active 
in Nepal and in academia elsewhere.
Within FIC, grant management and expenditure 
tracking was handled by the Grants and Budget 
Coordinator and the Administrative and Finance 
Director. The Tufts University Office of 
Research Administration was responsible for the 
overall administration of financial aspects for the 
grant. The University of Edinburgh has a 
dedicated research administration office called 
ERI (Edinburgh Research and Innovation). This 
oversight included ensuring that all researchers 
had current certificates of completion for the 
Protection of Human Research Subjects course, 
sponsored by the Collaborative Institutional 
Training Initiative (CITI).
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As our previous research has highlighted, the 
transformation in the nature of labor from rural 
to urban and from agricultural to non-
agricultural has not been linear. Because of 
population growth and pressure on land, it has 
become progressively almost impossible for 
laboring households to sustain their livelihoods 
exclusively from agriculture or from non-land-
based wage work. The vast majority of families 
must therefore draw their livelihoods from both. 
This takes many forms, ranging from non-
agricultural wage labor in construction or trade 
in the village or neighboring area, to commuting 
to nearby district centers for day labor, to longer 
distance mobility within and outside Nepal. 
Mobility of labor has become a significant and 
increasing part of the rural political economy. 
Large numbers of men and an increasing number 
of women are out-migrating in search of work 
opportunities within and outside Nepal. 
We maintain that there are significant 
similarities, as well differences, when it comes to 
internal or international labor migration. For 
example, there are those who work as 
construction workers in Nepal and in the Gulf 
and also in India, and there are those who work 
as domestic workers in India, Nepal, and the 
Gulf, and in the service sector such as hotel/
restaurants. While the issue of citizenship or lack 
thereof becomes much more important when 
one is working in the Gulf or India, which often 
leads to social dislocation and constraints on 
personal freedom, those who remain within 
Nepal remain marginal or unequal citizens. 
Except for a few factories that eventually died in 
the face of global commodity flows, Nepal has 
largely skipped industrialization. Thus 
employment opportunities for rural labor have 
been mostly in the informal service sectors and 
small-scale processing factories. The poorer 
sections of the population from rural Nepal end 
up migrating to nearby towns or cities to work 
in brick kilns, construction work, domestic 
work, hotels/restaurants, factories such as carpet 
and garment, and small-scale manufacturing that 
exist in and around towns in the Terai. While it 
is impossible to provide a thorough account of 
each of these sectors in this report, we will 
highlight the work processes and living and 
working conditions of migrants working in a few 
of these sectors, with illustrations drawn from 
our fieldwork. Our aim is to treat these findings 
as indicative of the subordinate positions of the 
laboring population in different sectors of the 
economy. 
Brick Kiln Workers in Kathmandu Valley
There are about 700 brick kilns all over Nepal, 
mostly located on the outskirts of cities and 
towns, each employing an average of 300–500 
workers. It is estimated that in the Kathmandu 
valley alone there are more than 150 brick kilns 
and at least 400 workers in each kiln. The brick 
kiln industry, which involves molding and firing 
of clay bricks, employs a large number of men, 
women, and children. Workers in the brick 
kilns, almost all of whom are seasonal migrants 
from rural areas, constitute one of the poorest 
and weakest sections of the laboring population. 
Most of the workers in the brick kilns in the 
Kathmandu valley come from adjoining districts 
of Kathmandu and also from poorer areas of the 
mid-western hills. 
The production of bricks is directly related to 
demand in the construction sector. Because of 
the boom in the housing sector in the 
Kathmandu valley in the last decade and a half, 
the brick kilns are also thriving. The work is 
seasonal, i.e., the production of bricks starts 
before the winter (around October and 
November) and stops before the monsoon/rainy 
season (around April and May) for about 5 to 7 
months a year and is labor-intensive. Although a 
small number of workers are employed during 
the off-season, it is the production period when 
there is a high demand of migrant laborers from 
different parts of the country and even from 
bordering districts of India. 
The workers in the brick kilns not only represent 
the poorest and weakest sections of the laboring 
populations; they are also susceptible to low pay, 
difficult and unhealthy working conditions, and 
exploitation. The wage rates and minimum 
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wages do not really reflect the degree of 
exploitation of the workers in the kiln, bearing 
in mind that the child and women workers often 
remain as the invisible workforce.  
Work Processes and Division of Labor 
Brick making is a low-technology industry that 
is not only labor intensive but is also 
characterized by a distinct division of labor. 
Starting from the molding up to the extraction 
and storage and dispatching of baked bricks from 
the kiln, the division of labor may be broadly 
categorized as fivefold:
Molding: This activity employs the largest 
number of laborers in the kiln. The job requires 
preparing the pits, digging the clay, making the 
dough by continuously sprinkling water on the 
clay, and using hands and feet to shape the 
rounds of mud into bricks with the help of 
wooden mold provided by the brick kiln owner. 
After the bricks are molded, they are carried to 
be spread out in the sun and turned on all sides 
for even drying. Once they are dry, they must be 
piled up so they can be picked up by the next set 
of workers who carry them to the kiln. Molders 
are quick to pile the dried bricks as they are not 
liable for any damage after the bricks have been 
piled. However, if the bricks are damaged by 
rain before they are dry, they get no 
compensation. The molders are the largest 
concentration of workers and they come at the 
start of the season, in the months of October/
November. A month later, the other categories 
of workers follow. The molders’ job is labor 
intensive and forms the base of the kiln. The 
pace at which the kiln will operate, the number 
of rounds of firing that the kiln will make in a 
season, and the optimization of production all 
depend on the speed at which the molders work. 
Depending on the demand for bricks at the 
baking site or in the market, molders are 
expected to provide flexible labor and deliver 
accordingly. 
Often, but not always, family units work 
together in the molding. When family units are 
involved, one can clearly see a gendered and 
generational division of labor. The able-bodied 
men sprinkle water on the clay prepared the 
previous evening into dough. They knead it with 
their feet to make it more pliable and children 
often join in that job. After the dough is ready 
the women hand over the lumps of wet clay and 
the men shape them into bricks with the help of 
a wooden mold provided by the kiln owner. The 
prepared bricks are kept on wooden planks also 
provided by the owner. The women and the 
children work alongside, and that is how the 
children too learn their work and grow up to be 
molders themselves. Then the women and the 
children take the molded bricks to dry in the sun 
Left: “Chit” used to record the loads of bricks carried by each migrant worker. Right: Migrant worker having his 
“chit” stamped after carrying a load of bricks, brick kiln, Kathmandu Valley
Photos: Sanjaya Aryal
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while the man continues to mold. The bricks 
have to be turned on all sides for even drying. 
Women and children too do this work. Where 
family units are not available, 2–3 laborers get 
together and form a production unit. 
Loading kaccha (unbaked) bricks (or 
carrying with donkeys): The job requires 
carrying the unbaked dried bricks from the 
molding and drying site to the kilns. The 
workers may carry the bricks on their backs 
using ropes or use donkeys or a cart. The 
workers carrying the bricks are covered in a 
heavy layer of dust from the unbaked bricks. 
This is often called the “donkey job” in the kiln. 
In the kilns in Kathmandu, this job was mainly 
done by the workers from the mid-western hills, 
although workers from other parts of Nepal also 
carried bricks to the kiln.
Brick baking at the kiln: Here the work 
involves arranging the bricks in the kiln for 
firing, stacking them with earth and making 
them ready for the baking process, and firing the 
kiln and watching continuously to ensure that 
the bricks are being properly baked. This 
specialized task is done by a different category of 
workers. Many of the experienced master bakers 
come from India.
Unloading pakka (baked) bricks: A different 
set of workers take out the hot baked bricks from 
the kilns and sort and stack them according to 
the quality of the bricks. Men, women, and 
children are involved in this work. 
Dispatching: There is another category of 
workers called loaders who only load the trucks 
carrying the bricks to the market/clients. 
In Kathmandu, we found that molding is done 
mostly but not always by workers in family units 
from nearby districts such as Kavrepalanchowk, 
Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Ramechhap, and 
Makwanpur. The brick-loading job is done by 
workers, usually men, from mid-western hilly 
districts such as Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, 
Pyuthan, and Dang. The brick-baking job or the 
kiln work is done by workers from Darbhanga 
district, Bihar, India, and the unloading of pakka 
bricks is done by women, men, and children 
from Darbhanga, India. Dispatching is done by 
both Nepali and Indian workers, both men and 
women. 
The work in the kilns is divided in such a way 
that different groups do not have contact/
communication with each other and usually 
come from different parts of the country. There 
is no upward mobility, as the laborers do not 
learn any specific skills working at the kiln, and 
also there is no room for promotion to higher 
positions. 
There are accountants, hired by the kiln owners, 
who maintain the accounts, which includes 
payment of advances to the contractors. 
Advances are made through the contractor on a 
weekly basis to the workers for their living 
expenses. These accountants also supervise the 
work, and make payment to chowkidars (guards) 
who keep a watch over the bricks and their 
makers. 
Labor contractors or naikes are important actors 
not only in the recruitment of the labor but also 
in the discipline and the supervision of the labor 
force in the kiln. Often but not always, the naikes 
are of two categories—one is the contractor of 
molders and the other is a contractor for other 
tasks. Where Indian workers are involved, they 
often have an Indian contractor. 
Recruitment of Labor
The workers come to work in the kilns through 
a middleman or contractor called a naike. The 
recruitment is accompanied by payment of 
advances by the kiln owner through the naike to 
the workers for a specified period of 
employment, i.e., usually for a season. An 
individual or an entire family (excluding old, 
disabled, and dependent persons) comprising 
husband, wife, and children may be recruited to 
the brick kilns and work as one unit for the full 
season of the operating kiln. It is the social 
network that sustains the recruitment of laborers 
from certain source areas to the brick kilns in 
Kathmandu. Very often the naike also comes 
from the same locality/district as the workers do. 
The recruitment of the labor force through the 
naike is arranged through a system of advance 
payment called peshki. The workers are provided 
with peshki through the naike before they join the 
Structural Violence and Social Suffering among Marginal Nepali Migrants 17
work—they take the amount either during the 
lean period (starting from the monsoon season, 
when they need some money to celebrate the 
harvest festival of Dashain) or before leaving the 
village to travel to the kiln. The amount varies 
from NRs 2,000 to 20,000 for loaders and 
unloaders and NRs 50,000 to 100,000 for 
molders where a family unit is involved. The 
naike’s role is to arrange and supply a labor force 
to the kiln, supervise them, and settle the 
workers’ financial accounts. A few naikes, 
especially naikes of the molders, may bring their 
family to work while simultaneously working as 
naike.
The peshki plays both a positive and negative role 
for the laborers. On the one hand, the laborers 
get money in advance that they can use to meet 
their needs in the village; on the other hand, 
they fall into the trap of bondedness because of 
the advance payment. It is this advance payment 
that helps the naike ensure a smooth supply of 
laborers in the next session. 
The transportation cost (one way) is paid 
separately by the naike to the workers. If a 
worker wishes to leave mid-term, he has to 
return the balance of the advance. Workers leave 
mid-term for various reasons. The most common 
is that there is not enough work at the kiln. 
Therefore, because they are paid on a piece basis, 
it is to the workers’ advantage to move to bigger 
kilns. The labor agents of nearby kilns are always 
on the lookout for workers and, depending on 
the demand of each, kiln workers are lured away 
from one kiln to the other. The new recruiting 
agent then has to clear the advance due to the 
previous labor agent. This payment is not made 
directly by one labor agent to another but paid 
through the worker involved in the switch. 
Other reasons for leaving are: better living 
conditions offered at alternative sites, disputes 
with the labor agent over wages and adjustments 
against advance, or personal reasons.
The naike can negotiate his rate of commission 
with the owners and he can choose the owners 
or the brick kiln for the following year based on 
his perceived benefits. But the workers don’t 
have freedom to choose their place of work 
themselves as they have to work under the naike, 
and the owners also avoid dealing with 
individual workers and prefer dealing with the 
naike as a group leader.
System of Payment 
Most workers, if not all, who work in the brick 
kilns have taken an advance payment through 
their naike. While the advance payment often 
attracts workers to the kilns, it also forces them 
to work hard not only to repay the loan but also 
to earn money to escape from this bondage in 
future. Work in the brick kilns is organized on a 
piece-rate basis, and there is a fixed rate per 
thousand bricks for the different kinds of work. 
The payment for the work is made either at the 
beginning as an advance payment or at the end 
of work as a final payment. No apparent interest 
is charged on the advance made to the workers. 
The workers’ record of work is updated on a 
weekly basis (during the weekly day-off day), 
and they are provided with a certain amount on 
a weekly basis for their subsistence called haphta. 
These amounts do not match up to the value of 
their work and the wages that are due to them in 
accordance with what they have produced. They 
receive only about one fourth of their wages on a 
regular basis. The money given to them towards 
expenses and the advance that they have taken 
are both deducted at the end of the season when 
the final payment is made. In a way, the owners 
and the contractors hold the workers back until 
they have earned enough to pay back the 
advance and the amount that they have been 
given as expenses. It is not easy for the workers 
to leave the kiln as and when they wish to look 
for better or alternative work opportunities.
 
The wages are fixed every year between owners 
and contractors. The contractors and the workers 
raise their demands every year in the middle of 
the season, and negotiation begins. The raised 
amount is paid at the end of the season from the 
day it is made effective, which leaves maximum 
room for the owner’s manipulation. The workers 
join at the previous year’s wage rates and have no 
say in the negotiation of the rates. 
Workers exploitation begins from the day they 
sign up to work. As mentioned, most workers are 
paid on piece rate per thousand bricks. The 
owners, as well as the naikes and the system of 
wages, give the impression that a worker earns a 
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lot as one can prepare or carry x thousand bricks 
in a day. However, their hypothetical 
mathematical calculations fail, as they do not 
take into account the number of hours they put 
into work, days off for illness and other reasons, 
and the suffering they go through. 
The piece-rate system hides the necessary labor 
time and the variations in the strength of the 
team, and also the contribution of invisible 
workers, in particular the children. The 
minimum wages earned therefore are in total 
divergence from what sounds fine as per 
thousand rates. 
The earnings from the brick kilns are for a 
period of six to seven months depending on the 
nature of work. For example, the molders work 
from November till May and the others all come 
a month later when substantial number of bricks 
have been molded and are ready to be stacked 
and fired. At the end of the season, when the 
workers go home, they often find that they are 
left with just the money to pay for their travel 
back home with the family and no more after 
deducting the advance and what they had been 
given for their survival for the months that they 
have worked. The difference between what they 
have earned and the amount that they settle with 
the owner and the contractor gives them the 
extra earnings with which they hope to go back 
to the village and manage their expenses, along 
with earnings from the village, until it is time 
for their return to the kiln. Those who are left 
with no difference take an advance from the 
contractor with the promise of returning the 
next season. Some, as we will see, also seek 
casual labor in India during the months when 
they are not working in the kilns. The 
contractors negotiate from a different economic 
position, but often hail from the same village. 
The workers mentioned that even if they wanted 
to run away from the oppressive working 
conditions and labor relations they did not wish 
to embarrass the contractor who is one of their 
own, and they can resort to him for loans when 
they need to, back in the village. 
Working and Living Conditions
Located in the outskirts of the city or market 
areas, the brick kiln is a particular kind of place 
that has a “camp-like,” temporary feel. It is a 
place where workers live and work day and 
night, and are continuously under the 
surveillance of their supervisors. There is very 
little separation between private and public life 
in these kilns. It is possible to see the workers 
carrying bricks, molding, baking, and even 
cooking, washing, sleeping, and playing at the 
same time. 
As mentioned earlier, the laborers work on 
contract and piece basis. Hence, the people who 
are strong enough carry more or work more and 
can make more money than the others. 
Therefore, it is very easy for the workers to 
self-exploit themselves. The molders, loaders, 
and unloaders work normally for 12–14 hours 
daily with between half and a full day off per 
week. 
There are no workplace standards when it comes 
to working in brick kilns. The work does not 
offer bonus or provident funds, maternity leave, 
protective gear, gratuity, or medical benefits. 
Workers are not compensated for days when 
work stops because of rain or for some other 
reason. 
All implements are provided by the owners. The 
molders pay for their own gas lights and also 
bring their own implements for digging; there is 
no electricity; no facility for communication in 
case of emergency such as phone; no crèche; no 
separate rest room; no toilets. There is no 
drainage facility; no open space for cooking. 
Workers and their children are exposed to the 
fumes of the kiln day and night. The molders 
make their own shelters using the unbaked bricks 
they have prepared. Workers live in very small 
rooms on a shared basis, and tend to cook and 
eat in small groups of 3–5. Workers look 
extremely fatigued, dusty, and sweaty. Their diet 
is not particularly nourishing. Their regular meal 
tends to be rice and potato curry, supplemented 
with lentils and meat on an occasional basis. 
There is no supplementary nutritious meal for 
children. 
The day starts early for the kiln workers. They 
may start as early as 5 am, and take a break for 
lunch for 1–2 hours, and then work again until 
late evening. When the family is working as a 
production unit, the woman finishes the cooking 
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and washing early so that she can join her 
husband in molding or carrying the bricks. If 
there is a young daughter, she may help the 
mother in cooking, and the mother can help in 
breaking the clots of earth too. After the clay has 
been worked, the woman hands over the lumps 
of mud, and the man shapes them into bricks 
with the help of a wooden mold provided by the 
kiln owner. He puts the prepared bricks on 
wooden planks also provided by the owners to 
dry. The women and the children work 
alongside, and that is how the children too pick 
up the skills to become molders themselves. The 
morning shift is up to 2 pm. After a break for 
lunch, the work is resumed in the afternoon. 
Before retiring for the day, the earth is dug and 
dough is prepared for the next day’s work. 
Women and children supervise the water 
channel while the men dig the earth with a 
shovel. At 6 pm the man relaxes, smoking and 
talking to his friends or just sitting on a quilt in 
front of his hut, while the woman gets busy with 
the cooking of the evening meal and sleeps only 
after she has served the food and washed the 
utensils. Our fieldwork shows that very often the 
workers carry on until 10:00 or 10:30 pm, 
having started at 5:00 in the morning, with an 
hour’s rest for lunch.
The workers spend the income from the brick 
kiln mainly to cover day-to-day expenses. Apart 
from this, these days, young men and women 
may spend their money on buying a mobile 
phone. A few workers also collect and remit the 
money for renovating their house back in the 
village or buying a solar electric system. The 
workers have a half-day off every week in which 
they use their time for washing and recreation 
(playing sports, visiting places, shopping, 
watching movies).
The unpaid labor component is quite high for 
the workers. Molders arrive first at the kiln and 
the other categories of workers join a month 
later. Not only does the worker have to build a 
dwelling place in his own time, but also has to 
select a suitable place where the clay can be dug 
and prepare it by clearing all vegetation, stones, 
and foreign matter so that the clay is as fine as 
possible for the best results in brick-making. No 
payment is made for this work.
In the beginning, for about a week, the workers 
have to sustain themselves with the advance 
money paid to them back in the village. The 
workers also need to travel to purchase supplies 
or in case of ill health when no payment is made. 
Working hours are lost during winter rains, not 
to mention other work stoppages arbitrarily 
decided by kiln owners or dictated by a 
reduction in demand for bricks. 
The workers keep worksheets where they 
maintain an account of how many bricks they 
have produced or carried during the day. Most of 
them are illiterate and depend on the contractor 
or accountant to stamp the sheet to account for 
their day’s work. 
Overall, our fieldwork amongst the brick kiln 
workers shows that they are susceptible not only 
to difficult and exploitative working conditions 
but also to conditions that cause social 
dislocation, humiliation, debt entrapment, 
suffering, and structural violence. First, the 
payment structure that is organized on a piece 
rate per thousand forces the workers to self-
exploit themselves. The desire to earn more 
money leads workers to over-work, which causes 
ill health and suffering. Second, the workers are 
organized into different categories and small 
production units. They are expected to perform 
specialized tasks and are under constant 
surveillance by the contractors or accountants. 
This offers very little social interaction and 
contributes to social dislocation. Moreover, 
because of the division of labor and different 
areas of origin of the different categories of 
workers, there is little ground for expression of 
common grievances or resistance. Third, the 
work at the brick kiln does not offer any new 
skills or possibility of social mobility for the 
workers, as there is no possibility of promotion 
or upward mobility in the job. Fourth, the 
working conditions in the brick kilns are 
unhealthy, often dangerous, and nowhere close 
to any workplace standards. Fifth, the system of 
advance payment is the basis for the exploitation 
and bondage of the workers. It is key not only 
for the continued recruitment of the workers but 
also to produce workers’ consent to work under 
cheap labor and exploitative conditions.  
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Domestic Workers
  “It was as tough as chewing stones.” 
(Female caregiver returning from Israel, 
interviewed in Kathmandu)
Although we did not conduct specific fieldwork 
amongst domestic workers in Kathmandu, 
interviews with NGOs and trade unions 
provided us with a picture of the types of 
exploitative labor arrangements for domestic 
workers. One particularly common practice is 
“domestic work in exchange for going to 
school.” We were able to observe such practices 
in Helambu where one frequently sees young 
girls, sometimes as young as ten, usually from 
poor Tamang or Bahun families, working as 
servants in Sherpa/Hyolmo Lama households or 
guesthouses. Household chores are done in 
exchange for access to school. Ethical constraints 
precluded interviews with these subjects, and it is 
unclear to what extent the practices actually do 
promote schooling or are abusive. In 
Kathmandu, however, we were able to interview 
two female aspiring migrants who had previously 
worked as domestic workers for families in 
Kathmandu. Both had been sent by their parents 
to work for a family from the same village living 
in Kathmandu in exchange for schooling. They 
had started at around age ten. One had had a 
positive experience working for a supportive 
family that allowed her to continue her 
education; the chores had not been too onerous. 
The other had had a less positive experience: 
chores were heavy and interfered with schooling 
and the family tried (unsuccessfully) to force the 
young girl into an arranged marriage.
The point here is the continued existence of 
semi-feudal bonded relationships that involve 
child labor even in areas that are rapidly 
becoming globalized (new roads and marketed 
goods, including vegetables from Kathmandu, 
were visible in many hitherto remote villages 
that we visited). An interesting observation is the 
stratified nature of aspirations; Tamang families 
send their children to work for Sherpa families in 
the area or in Kathmandu, where in a sense they 
remain beholden to ethnic relations of 
subordination. Sherpa/Hyolmo families aspire to 
send their daughters abroad as domestic workers 
or carers—the most sought-after destinations 
being Lebanon and Israel—if not to study in 
western universities. For example, in 
neighboring villages in Helambu, we found that 
two guesthouse owners—relatively well-off and, 
because of their trade, accustomed to dealing 
with foreigners—had sent their children to 
prestigious universities in London and 
California.
The “domestic work for school” arrangement is 
widespread in Kathmandu and other urban areas. 
The practice of sending young girls (and some 
boys) to work as servants in the cities is of course 
not new, but the education twist is relatively 
new. These arrangements tend to peter out when 
girls reach puberty. Girls then either return to 
their villages or enter the equally, if not more, 
exploitative restaurant and hotel service sector. 
This is a sector in which it is notoriously difficult 
to conduct research and one in which trafficking 
is also frequent. On the bus from Kathmandu to 
Melamchi, a Tamang lady spontaneously told us 
about a recent incident in her village. From our 
fieldnotes:
  An agent from Kathmandu had tried to sell some 
14–15 young girls from her village in India. She 
knew two of the girls (distant relatives). They were 
literate but they didn’t know why the person was 
taking them to India. They were told they would 
have a good, easy job in India. The agent had 
already taken a few girls to India earlier in two lots 
and this time he was trying to take more girls. He 
was caught at the India-Nepal border and now he is 
in the police custody. The ladies were rescued from 
the border by an NGO and were now living and 
getting some vocational training in Kathmandu. 
They were not staying in the village (it seems that 
they were facing a problem of rehabilitation into their 
family and village). She also said that people do not 
have a good view towards the girls coming back from 
Bombay because they are suspected of being sex 
workers, so they often stay in Kathmandu after their 
return. (Fieldnotes, Melamchi, May 2012)
We were able to collect information on direct 
experiences of domestic labor abroad through 
interviews with returning female migrants or 
with aspiring repeat migrants waiting for their 
papers/visa in guesthouses in Kathmandu. Given 
the small number of interviews (12), these can 
hardly be considered as a representative sample, 
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but they do give some idea of the types of 
situations encountered. The experiences 
recorded range from the broadly positive to 
downright abusive.
Two young women had worked as maids for 
families in Lebanon and had found this to be a 
generally positive experience, with reasonable 
working conditions that corresponded to what 
they had been told before their departure. While 
the hours may have been long, the conditions 
were not abusive, and salary was paid on time. 
Personal movements were however very limited: 
in both cases the maids were never allowed to 
leave the house on their own, allegedly for their 
own protection, and had no contact with other 
Nepali migrants during their stay. Their 
“owner” (as one young woman referred to her 
employer) would accompany them to the 
shopping mall when they wanted to call their 
family back home. Experience of women 
working as carers for the elderly or disabled in 
Israel was similar; although the pay was higher, 
so was the exploitation, with long hours and 
hardly any time off.  
While the working conditions are more 
predictable and access to recourse is easier, the 
cost of migrating to Israel (and the same applies 
to Malaysia and South Korea) is higher than for 
other destinations. One young woman had to 
take out a loan of NRs 500,000 for the 
manpower agency and related costs (at an 
interest rate of 60 percent per year). As the 
salary was good, she was able to pay back her 
creditors in 15 months. Nonetheless, 
expressions of suffering were always close to the 
surface. A young woman returning from Israel 
after two years as a caregiver expressed it as 
follows: “My sorrow is impossible to show, my heart 
is full of it. Bidesh ma kam garnu ra dhunga ko 
cheura chabaunu malai yautai lagyo.” (It was as 
tough as chewing stones). On the plus side, she had 
two million NRs remaining after paying all her 
debts. So, she had bought a piece of land and 
built a small house in her village. Her two 
children were also studying in a good school. 
Now she said that she would never go for 
migration anywhere. “If I had already known 
about the sorrows I had to go through in Israel, I 
would have never gone there.” 
Interviewees who had been to Israel and 
Lebanon had often worked hard and experienced 
suffering but also positive outcomes. Not so, 
however, in the Gulf. Despite the Nepali 
restrictions in place to protect young women 
(minimum age of 30) and the ban on migration 
to certain countries (Saudi Arabia), many women 
seem prepared to accept the known risks and 
sometimes find themselves in extraordinarily 
abusive situations. The desire for a better life is 
such that, in order to escape these restrictions, 
young girls and women place their confidence in 
a chain of intermediaries, often starting with a 
relative in the village, that involves more or less 
bogus manpower agencies based in India and 
their counterparts in the destination countries. 
There is not even the minimal protection 
provided by registered manpower agencies based 
in Nepal and therefore no recourse when salary 
and working conditions turn out to be very 
different from what was promised.  
Among the small number (less than ten) of 
returnees from migrating to the Gulf, only two 
had had relatively positive experiences (one of 
them was working for an Indian family in Saudi 
Arabia and had moved from housework to 
driving the family’s car; the other worked on a 
farm). The others suffered from varying levels of 
physical and psychological abuse. One was 
pushed down the stairs of the house she was 
working in by her employer because she had 
complained to the Nepali embassy about her 
working conditions—and this had caused a loss 
of face for the employer—and had to be 
repatriated in a semi-unconscious state with 
permanent disabilities. Two women had to flee 
their employers’ home by escaping down the 
drainpipe and tying their sheets together in a 
rope because they were not only abused 
physically but also kept in conditions akin to 
slavery.
Another woman was repeatedly raped for weeks 
by the son of her employers who refused to do 
anything about the situation until it was clear she 
was pregnant—at which point they handed her 
over to the manpower agency from which she 
had been recruited. She eventually returned to 
Nepal with her child, no savings, and a number 
of debts to repay, not to mention the social 
stigma she would be facing. She was staying in 
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an NGO shelter in Kathmandu: “While boarding 
the plane for the first time, I was much afraid thinking 
what would happen to me in bidesh (migration 
abroad). But at the back of my mind I was optimistic 
that I would get a good job, would be able to earn a lot 
of money, that I could invest for educating my children 
and in building a small house.” Now her one and 
only hope is that someone will adopt her child 
and that she could then be with her family who 
knows nothing about her situation. To be with 
her family is her ultimate destination.
The following excerpt from a long interview 
with a young woman who had migrated via 
India to Kuwait, and who was waiting in 
Kathmandu for her papers in order to legally 
migrate to Dubai, gives an idea of the risks and 
problems encountered.
  In my village, I heard that many people including 
girls were migrating to Gulf countries. One “Aunty” 
(a woman from the neighborhood) motivated me to 
migrate to the Gulf and said that one of the 
manpower companies is sending girls in good 
companies. She showed the manpower company to 
me and we went there and gathered information. I 
became interested to migrate as the company person 
said that there is a very good work opportunity in 
Kuwait where I should work as security person of a 
madam. He told me that the work is very easy but 
the salary is very good. Then my aspiration increased 
very much and I planned to migrate by any means. 
  The company helped in issuing my passport and 
paid the money themselves as I had said that it will 
take some time to arrange money so they had issued 
it very urgently saying that there is urgent demand 
from the company for ladies. The company was 
demanding NRs 100,000 and my family did not 
have the money so we requested to pay it once I 
earned money in Kuwait. The manpower agency 
person agreed and arranged for my visa and travel 
process.
  The manpower person took 5–6 of us (all ladies) to 
Silgadhi, India, and from there he took us to 
Bombay. We were not informed properly that he was 
taking us to Kuwait. At that time I didn’t know 
about the legal/illegal process of migration. Hence, I 
was just thinking to go to Kuwait and earn money. I 
was not at all afraid as I had lived and studied in 
India. The manpower person had consulted with a 
manpower company in Bombay and from there he 
sent us to Kuwait. After landing in Kuwait, they 
took our fingerprints and a company person came at 
the airport to receive us. He took our passport and 
took us to his office. While we were sitting there, a 
man (baba) came and he looked at all of us and 
chose me. I found later on that, it is like selling girls 
(keti bechne jastai raichha)—persons who need a 
housemaid are informed by the company once the 
ladies/housemaid arrive. They pay the company and 
take the housemaid/lady they prefer. So in the same 
manner, the man chose me and paid money to the 
company saying that he is ready to keep me as 
housemaid. So in that way the company sold me 
(malai tyasari bechyo!). 
  As I had been told that I would work as a security 
person of a madam, I was very afraid and nervous. I 
was thinking that the man would take me 
somewhere and kill me. I was more afraid as I didn’t 
know the language and what they were saying. The 
man took me to his home. I worked at his home as 
housemaid for around one year. The work was very 
hard. They had six members in their family (owner, 
his wife, and four children). I had to do each and 
every thing in the house from 4–5 am in the 
morning to 11–12 at night and sometimes I had to 
work till 1–2 in the morning. The work involved: 
mopping the house early in the morning, cooking 
food, cleaning the entire house, washing clothes, 
going to the bazar with the owners to carry things 
back home. The company had said that I would 
have salary of 550 dinars per month, but they gave 
very little money. From the first month’s income, I 
had sent 280 dinars back home. I used to send some 
money to the family. Altogether, within 1.5 years, I 
was able to send NRs 100,000 home. 
  The work was tough, i.e., too much workload all the 
time. They used to eat different kinds of food. The 
mama (lady owner) taught me to cook food in the 
beginning. She used to work in a school and the baba 
(male owner) was a retired policeman. Mama was 
good, but baba didn’t treat me well. He didn’t look 
at me in a good way (malai naramro gari herthyo). 
One day baba tried to physically assault me, and 
that time I was able to escape from him. So it 
became too much for me—it was already too much 
work, and on top of that baba tried to assault me. So 
I didn’t feel secure there and thought to leave that 
house. Next day when nobody was home, I phoned 
the company and explained my troubles. There was 
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a Rai didi (Nepali woman) at the company (the 
company had employed 2–3 persons from different 
countries to deal with the workers from different 
countries), and they came to my house and took me 
out from the house. The company also returned back 
my passport. 
  Then, again, another man took me to work in his 
home. In that house baba never treated me bad. He 
used to respect my work and used to say that I work 
fast and good and I am very active. He also used to 
praise me for treating their three children well. But 
the mama of the house didn’t like me. Baba used to 
work in an office and mama used to stay at home. 
She was conservative and since baba had taken me to 
home from the company, she always used to suspect 
her husband and didn’t like her husband treating me 
well. Mama used to lock me in a room when male 
visitors came at home. Mama was very bad. She 
used to disrespect her husband. 
  During Ramadan, I had to work/cook food for the 
entire night. I was not able to sleep well as they used 
to eat food around 4–5 in the morning, and for that 
I had to prepare food at night. I had to do all the 
other household works during the day. So during the 
month, I had to work both day and night. In that 
house also, I had too much workload, and I never 
used to be free from early in the morning till late 
night. 
  One day I was not able to bear the workload and 
mama was pressurizing me to do much more work. 
So I told her that I am not able to continue work at 
her home and requested her to send me back to 
Nepal. But while I was working she went to my 
room and stole 200 dinars I had saved. When I 
asked her why she stole my things, she told me that 
they had spent money for my visa and documents 
and as I said I am going back home, she had taken 
the money and my belongings as compensation. She 
never returned that money to me even when I 
continued working for her.
  After working there in the house for 3–4 months, 
mama took me to her maternal home in Jordan 
during her children’s vacation in school. I didn’t 
know how she arranged visa for me to Jordan. After 
going there, her mother didn’t have a housemaid so 
mama forced me to work both for her mother and for 
her. They used to stay in two different flats and I 
had to work (cleaning, cooking everything) for both of 
the families. So I was very much pressurized by the 
overload of work. On top of that one day mama 
ordered me to clean their car. I became very angry 
and quarrelled with her. I said: “I have too much 
work, you have employed me to work for one family 
but you have forced me to work for two. And now 
how can you order me to wash the car? I cannot clean 
the car. If you say I have to do it, you just hire a boy 
to clean the car and if you cannot pay him, I will 
pay for him!” She felt a bit ashamed and got a boy 
to do the work—and she didn’t ask for money to me 
for that work. But later on she insisted that I do the 
car washing work as well—so my workload kept on 
increasing.
  As the school vacation ended, we all returned back to 
Kuwait. One day she again stole my money (more 
than 200 dinars that I had not send to my home), 
some clothes, and my citizenship card. When I asked 
her why she did that, she blamed me for stealing her 
money and clothes (which I had not done). She used 
to tell me that since she had employed me, she could 
do anything to me. By that time, I had been 
working in that house for more than six months. So 
I didn’t feel secure working there as she could do 
anything to me. So when she was not at home, I 
called the company saying that I don’t want to stay 
in that house anymore and I requested the Rai 
Aunty to rescue me. She suggested me to quietly 
leave the house and come to the company. Since I 
didn’t have anything to take with me (as everything 
was with mama), I quietly left the house and went to 
the company when nobody was at home. 
  The company asked my passport and other 
belongings from the employer, but mama threatened 
the company saying that I ran away from the house 
when nobody was at home and I had stolen things, 
so she would charge me for absconding and robbery 
and she is putting a stamp on my passport that 
would ban me from entering or working anymore in 
Kuwait. So, after hearing this from mama, the 
company suggested I go to the Nepal embassy and 
then return back to Nepal as I would suffer more—
as police could put me in the jail for absconding. So I 
went to the embassy and the embassy officials said 
they would arrange return back to Nepal by issuing a 
travel document rather than fighting legally against 
the house owners—as the chances to win the case 
would be too low as the case of absconding would be 
strong from the owner’s side.
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  Then I stayed at the embassy rescue shelter for 
suffering Nepalis. The embassy officials had told me 
that I could travel back within a week. But since I 
was looking for an opportunity to work in another 
place, I didn’t wish to return back instantly. But 
later on while staying there at the embassy, I met 
many Nepali girls who were staying there after being 
abused by their house owners. After listening to so 
many Nepali sisters, I decided to return back. There 
were more than 300 girls in the Nepali embassy, 
and all of them had different stories of suffering—
some were seriously ill, some were waiting for their 
compensation money to be paid by the owners, some 
were fighting legally against their employers.
  I also met a Nepali lady who was tortured—the 
house owners had put boiling oil on her back and she 
was doing treatment there and recovering very slowly. 
So after seeing and talking to all those Nepali ladies 
at the embassy, I became very scared and frustrated 
and decided to return back Nepal. 
  I estimated that more than 70 percent of the women 
who worked as housemaids used to get abused. 
Though I suffered a lot mainly due to the overload of 
work and taking away my money and belongings, I 
consider myself as a lucky person. Many of the 
housemaids didn’t get good food or a sleeping 
place—they had to sleep on a mattress in a corner of 
kitchen. I had a good room with good furniture and 
sleeping place, I used to eat the food that I had 
cooked for rest of the family members. 
  Later on, I found that I had been sent to Kuwait 
through a fraud manpower company (chori ko 
company), which worked through an India-based 
company. The India-based company worked through 
a Kuwait-based company. I also found that many of 
the ladies who had gone back to the manpower 
agency (in India) after being rescued claimed for 
compensation. But the company had disappeared. 
So, after returning back, I was unable to track them 
down. 
  After returning back from Kuwait. I stayed at my 
home for 2–3 years. As I was not able to earn 
money during my first visit, I was just thinking to go 
to Malaysia or Gulf to earn money. My father was 
not in favor of giving me permission to migrate once 
again. But my mother and younger sister supported 
me. They were convinced as I told them that I am 
going through a legal channel this time and working 
in a hospital rather than in an individual house. So 
this time also I applied through a manpower agency 
in Birtamod, Jhapa from where my cousin had 
recently gone to Dubai and he had got a good income 
there. This time, I am confident that I will get good 
work and good salary—as I am going through a 
legal channel. But still I am not confident whether I 
would get the work and salary in accordance with the 
agreement. Initially the manpower agency was telling 
me that I would get a helper’s job in a hospital. But 
now the company is not sure—so it may be the 
helper’s job in a hospital or another job. 
  The manpower is asking for 110,000 rupees this 
time, but we have negotiated the price down to 
100,000 rupees. I have done my medical test in 
Birtamod, but the manpower agency asked me to do 
it once again in Kathmandu. Apart from the money 
I have to pay for the manpower agency, I have 
expenses for orientation class, expenses to come and 
stay in Kathmandu. The manpower company had 
told me that my ticket and visa would come anytime 
in today or tomorrow. Hence, they have asked me to 
deposit the total money to their office in Birtamod, 
so my mother is going there to deposit the money. 
On top of that, the manpower agency have asked to 
pay 3,000 rupees additional money for paying at the 
airport.
  Though manpower agency has not shown me the 
agreement, they have said that my monthly salary 
would be 1,200 UAE dirhams. I have told them 
that if I won’t get a good work and salary mentioned 
in the agreement, I would return back and you have 
to pay back my money. And they have said me to be 
confident and that except for the visa fee they would 
return the ticket and other expenses (around 70,000 
rupees) if I return back. So that is why I am 
confident on this manpower company.
  Till now I haven’t signed any papers. They haven’t 
given me my passport. The orientation class teacher 
had advised to keep a copy of all the documents. But 
I haven’t got those documents till now and they are 
saying that I may have to fly tomorrow or the day 
after. So, I will know all the things only after 
reaching at the destination. They have fixed the 
salary (of 1,200). Though I have already migrated 
to foreign country, I am still new for Dubai. Hence, 
I cannot tell right now what will happen there.
  The first time, when I went to Kuwait, I was very 
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much afraid and nervous as I didn’t know the 
language, I didn’t know how the place would be and 
how the people would be. But I learnt the language 
within three months. During the first few days/
months, I had become like dumb. The baba/mama 
used to tell to do something, but I didn’t catch them, 
and they used to use signs for me. In a way it was 
very difficult. But in the other hand it was good as 
well, because as I didn’t know the language, I didn’t 
care whatever they tell me—I used to think that they 
are saying good things to me. But as I learnt the 
language, I felt very disgusted to hear the bad things 
they were saying to me and they used to scold me a 
lot. The owners used to take me as a commodity. 
They didn’t treat me as a human. They always used 
to think that they had paid money for me so I have 
to do each and every thing for them.
  I am going again because, I was not able to fulfill my 
desire to earn money the first time. I think that I 
know many things about the Gulf countries now. 
So, I know what to do and what not. I want to earn 
money and then start a business in Nepal. As I am 
not educated, I cannot get good work and earn good 
money in Nepal. So, if I migrate to the Gulf 
countries or Malaysia, I can earn much more money 
than I can ever earn in Nepal. My plan is that if I 
can earn 500,000 Indian rupees (800,000 Nepali 
rupees), I will invest the money in some business in 
Nepal and start my own work. 
As we can see, gender and generational 
considerations feature prominently in domestic 
work, whether it is within Nepal or outside. 
Women domestic migrant workers are dutiful 
daughters and self-sacrificing mothers or hard-
working wives who have embarked on a journey 
to support their household, but is often tough 
and painful and at the cost of their family, and 
children in particular. While women make 
decisions to migrate to support their family, 
paradoxically they must be away to do so, which 
puts emotional strain on them. In their endeavor 
to maximize their income, the physical 
displacement may cause emotional upheaval in 
the lives of the women and their family back 
home. As these women migrant domestic 
workers travel to offer comfort to privileged 
women in the Gulf States and free them from 
labor related to the care of children, these 
migrant women’s absence in their own 
households puts significant pressure on the care 
of elderly, children, and others left behind.
Migrants, women, and domestic workers all face 
exclusion, but women domestic migrant workers 
are particularly vulnerable due to multiple 
exclusion they face in the destination. They are 
not only migrants but also women who work in 
the domestic sphere, and therefore they have 
access to very low levels of protection and 
justice, and are susceptible to discrimination, 
abuse, and exploitation. While their participation 
in the labor market and life outside of the 
households does offer them autonomy and 
challenges social and cultural norms associated 
with Nepali women’s subjugation, it is 
undermined by the domestic work that 
reproduces gender hierarchies and poor legal and 
social protection that puts their dignity and 
safety at risk. Working conditions in the 
reproductive or domestic sphere may lead to the 
intensification, decomposition, and re-
composition of gender inequalities. Typical work 
involves cleaning, washing, and cooking as well 
as caring for children, the elderly, and the infirm, 
and is vulnerable to employer abuses. The 
structural violence and dislocation that women 
face involve working long hours, withholding of 
documents and salary, denial of food and sleep, 
lack of social life and belonging, constant threat 
of physical and emotional abuse, lack of access to 
justice and legal remedy, etc. It is the 
commodification of labor and its institutionalization 
in the transnational space that strips women migrant 
domestic workers of their fundamental rights. In 
some sense, women migrant domestic workers’ 
condition is comparable to “bare life,” i.e., a life 
that has very little value and worth.
Despite the known abuses, the governments of 
destination countries, the recruitment agencies, 
and the employers view migrants as merely a 
workforce to meet labor shortages and generally 
do not privilege protective measures and gender-
sensitive policies. The government of Nepal is 
also unwilling and/or unable to address the 
situation, as it profits from the migrants’ 
remittances in hard currency. When profit 
maximization drives the entire migration 
process, issues of rights and legal protection of 
the migrants become secondary.
Embarking on a journey to paid employment has 
certainly offered opportunity for income to 
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women who otherwise are largely excluded from 
participation in the labor market. This has 
certainly challenged the stereotypical 
representation of Nepali women as unproductive 
and contributed to financial gains for women. 
However, it is the nature of domestic work that 
puts women through humiliation, as the work is 
not only “unskilled” but also something that 
they are doing for another family at the cost of 
not being able to provide care for their own 
family. Moreover, while women are often 
praised as sacrificing mothers and dutiful 
daughters for sending money to support the 
family back home, they are also susceptible to 
being seen as “loose women” who have spent 
time away from their family. Women’s agency, 
mobility, exposure, and wider experience do 
contribute to their sense of empowerment, 
which may challenge existing gender norms. 
Nevertheless, return and integration of these 
women is also likely to meet with gender-
specific challenges.
Construction Workers 
If there is one sector where the demand for labor 
has been consistently growing, it is the 
construction sector in Nepal. As the country 
struggles with modernization, through the 
construction of houses, schools, roads, irrigation 
canals, and other physical infrastructure in the 
cities, towns, and village centers, there has been 
a growing demand for labor and its mobility. 
Anyone who has conducted fieldwork in rural or 
urban Nepal cannot help but witness the 
construction work that is going on in the 
country and that is funded by the government, 
donors, and the private sector, as well as by the 
people themselves. The trucks full of concrete, 
iron, cement, and sand, and the number of stone 
and other quarries with excavators that one 
witnesses while travelling around Nepal gives 
the sense of the scale of construction in the 
country. This process has certainly benefitted the 
labor population, as demand for workers has 
increased and so has their pay. 
As a part of the research, we conducted fieldwork 
in a construction site of a major housing complex 
in Kathmandu and at a road construction site 
near Kathmandu. Although the construction 
sector is diverse and so are the working 
conditions, we use findings from our fieldwork 
in these two settings to illustrate the work 
processes involved and highlight the experiences 
of workers. 
Workers in the construction sector work on a 
daily-wage basis. The wage of the worker varies 
according to where and whether the work is 
arranged via a contractor or on his/her own. 
Construction workers with no specific skills in 
Kathmandu earned about NRs 500 per day, 
whereas the wage was around NRs 200–300 in 
small towns and villages outside of Kathmandu. 
However, if the work commitment was longer 
(or job security was higher) and was arranged via 
a contractor, the wage might go down to as low 
as NRs 290 per day, even in Kathmandu. The 
work often involved moving between work sites 
and different employers. Due to the increased 
demand for construction workers in the 
booming housing sector in Kathmandu, most 
laborers were found to be working with 
contractors as a way of securing job continuity. 
Often middlemen, who get a commission from 
the employer, are mobilized to recruit 
construction workers. They supply laborers using 
their social and work networks and are often 
employed as low-level supervisors in the 
construction site itself. Although the system of 
advance payment does exist in the construction 
sector, it is not as widespread as in the brick 
kilns. This gives the laborers more choice/
flexibility to move between work sites, and 
laborers are “freer” than in the brick kilns. 
Those who work in the construction sector often 
live at the work site or in rented accommodation 
together with friends or family. In major 
construction sites, workers appeared to have been 
equipped with health and safety concerns visible 
in terms of the helmet and jackets they were 
wearing, although most workers either had no 
shoes or very poor shoes providing little 
protection. In small-scale construction projects, 
safety measures were not followed and the work 
was arranged and managed informally.
In Kathmandu, construction workers gathered in 
specific sites in the morning, and labor 
contractors would come and pick them up for 
work in different parts of the city: 
Structural Violence and Social Suffering among Marginal Nepali Migrants 27
  I went to the western side of Maharajgunj crossing 
and saw many people gathered there in an open 
space. Some construction materials such as gravel and 
sand were piled up where the workers had been 
gathered. I saw a group of about five women (aged 
around 35–40) sitting on a gravel pile and talking to 
each other. Three–four youths were sitting in a group 
chatting among themselves. They were clearly 
expecting someone to come and offer them work: as 
soon I came close, all of these workers’ eyes were on 
me with expectation.
  Workers would gather here early in the morning from 
5 to 11 am from all parts of the valley, especially 
from surrounding areas, in search of work. 
Contractors or middlemen also came from different 
parts of the country to hire them. Many workers had 
come from different areas of Nepal. (Fieldnotes, 
Sanjaya, Kathmandu, May 2012)
Public work, including road construction and 
construction of government buildings and other 
infrastructure, is a major source of employment 
for the laboring population. During our 
fieldwork, we were able to observe a number of 
construction sites in different parts of Nepal. 
Often referred to as “ jyaladari kaam” (wage 
work/labor), these ranged from day work 
repairing a wall, to maintenance of pavements, 
to construction of houses and major roads. 
In the north of the Kathmandu valley where we 
carried out fieldwork in a road construction site, 
workers were divided into different groups 
according to their place of origin and the nature 
of their work. Those from Kapilbastu district in 
the Terai, about 300 kilometers away from the 
construction site, were in the biggest group with 
45 workers from a Tharu background, 15 female 
and 30 male, between the ages of 14 and 22 with 
a majority around 17–18 years of age. A local 
contractor had brought them to the construction 
site and was also supervising their work. Their 
work ranged from laying gravel to making the 
base to blacktop the road: laying gravel, cleaning 
the road surface (brushing and sweeping), 
blacktopping (spraying the tar), and topping it 
with gravel chips. Both male and female did 
Migrant workers from Kapilbastu and Banke doing preparatory work for blacktopping the road from Kathmandu 
to Nuwakot District
Photo: Sanjaya Aryal
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similar work. For example: 2–3 boys and 2–3 
girls were brushing the road surface (before 
blacktopping), and the same number of boys and 
girls were sweeping it to clear the dust particles 
that came out of the brushing. While 
blacktopping, 2–3 boys were spraying the tar and 
7–8 girls were putting the chips where the 
chips-topping truck had left gaps. Hence, 
basically, the laborers’ work was to backstop the 
main blacktopping work done through the 
machine. The Tharu workers’ supervisor was 
wearing a t-shirt, shorts, cap, and sport shoes, 
and his clothes and shoes were distinct from 
those of the other workers. The workers had 
slippers and trousers and a few had a cap and 
other had covered their heads with a 
handkerchief/scarf. The ladies were wearing 
kurta-salwar and flip-flops, a shawl or shirt to 
cover their upper body (extra cover on top of 
their kurta), a mask, and their heads were 
covered by a shawl. The truck drivers and 
laborers on the trucks were observed to be 
teasing/sexually harassing the girls both by 
saying things and trying to hit or touch them 
with the truck while they were working. 
However, the boys from the same group, i.e., 
Tharu boys were not harassing the girls (maybe 
because they were from the same village). The 
boys working with the tar were wearing canvas 
shoes (provided by the company), gloves, and 
black pieces of cloth to cover their head and face. 
The boys and girls who were doing the brushing 
and sweeping work were provided with masks.   
The male laborers slept in a big tent near the 
road, which accommodated about 30 workers, 
whereas the females had rented rooms on the 
ground floor of a house where the contractors 
and site manager were living on the first floor. 
They had a common mess to eat food. Three 
Tharu women (around the ages of 35–40) were 
there to run the mess. Their mess was outside 
the house where the female workers and 
contractors were staying. It had a kitchen under 
an open hut and did not have a particular place 
for eating food. Hence, the workers used to 
collect their food plates from the kitchen place 
and go to their sleeping place to eat the food. 
They had meals three times a day: light breakfast 
early in the morning, lunch around 11 am and 
dinner around 7 in the evening. They were 
having regular Nepali meal (daal/bhat and tarkari) 
for lunch and dinner. The Tharu group was 
living as a family; they were from the same 
village and mostly related to each other.  
There was also a small group of male laborers 
from Salyan, with ages ranging from 16 to 35. 
They were working on the side drainage of the 
road—both working as masons and laborers. 
Their accommodation was next to Tharu boys’ 
hut. They had one open hut as a kitchen and 
another as their sleeping place. The Salyan group 
did not have separate/extra people to run their 
mess and they were cooking their food 
themselves—they used to cook the food once for 
the entire day (for two meals)—around 11 in the 
morning and 7 in the evening. They ate daal 
bhat with very few vegetables. 
During our fieldwork, we met a young man, 
aged 17, from Salayan, who was working on the 
road’s drainage. This was the first time he had 
left his village for work. He came to work in 
road construction after taking the school leaving 
certificate exam along with two other boys. He 
knew about the work and the place from his 
father who used to work there as a mason and 
contractor. His father went back home to 
manage his land and sent him to work there so 
that he could study further. For him, the major 
reason for coming to work was the excitement of 
being close to Kathmandu. The contractor had 
told him that the work was in Kathmandu and 
that he would have daily wage of NRs 350 
rupees per day. However, now he thinks that the 
contractor had betrayed him, as the work is not 
in Kathmandu, and he has not seen the city yet. 
He was brought directly to the construction site 
via the Kathmandu Bus Park without spending 
any time in Kathmandu. 
He did not seem very happy. He found that the 
work was heavy for him. He worked for 12 
hours from 6am to 6pm on a daily basis. 
Although he was promised NRs 350 per day, he 
was paid only NRs 300 per day. He was 
planning to go home after the monsoon when he 
would have saved NRs 10,000 to 12,000 for 2.5 
months of work. He had plans to go to 
Kathmandu and buy clothes and shoes for his 
family and then take the cash to use it for 
household expenses and for his education—to 
buy books. Although he was interested in 
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continuing his studies, he was not sure whether 
that would be possible, as his father wanted him 
to start working and earning some money.
Earlier, his father used to go to work as a 
construction worker in Himanchal in India. His 
father preferred to work in Nepal, as India was 
far away and there was always a kind of fear 
while travelling back from the work place—
looting, maltreatment at the border, and high 
expense of travel. Many people (mainly boys) 
from his village continued to go to work in 
Himanchal. Based on his father’s experience, he 
said that people got timely payment in India, but 
he is not sure whether he will get the amount on 
time in his current job. 
He wanted to study and later on open a shop 
(grocery store) in the town of Dang. He did not 
like the idea of migrating to India and other 
countries (bidesh) for work. He said that in recent 
years, the trend of people (16 to 40 years of age) 
going to bidesh from his village had increased a 
lot. Many boys from his village have gone to 
Malaysia and a few to Dubai. They had to invest 
more than NRs 150,000 rupees. For him, going 
to bidesh by taking out a loan was not a good 
idea, and since he has no money, he has never 
thought about it.
His monthly expenses at the construction site 
come around NRs 3,000 to NRs 4,000; that 
includes the cost of his mobile phone and meals. 
He does not get paid for overtime work. If there 
is no work because of “bandh” (shut-down) or 
due to rain, he does not get money for the day. 
He says that contractors lure the villagers by 
“showing a good dream” but when they reach 
the destination, they find a completely different 
picture. He does not like to work in the 
construction sector any more. But, he is not sure 
whether he can discontinue the work in future.
He was wearing second-hand clothes (re-stitched 
t-shirt and trouser), cap, and slippers. He would 
wash his clothes during his free time, and the 
washed clothes were hung on a rope near the 
tent. His work during the day was mixing 
cement, carrying stones, and helping the masons. 
In the evening, he along with other workers 
unloaded cement bags from the trucks and stored 
them in a house.    
The construction site had several female laborers, 
some of whom were young. One of the girls said 
that she followed the footsteps of her sister who 
came to work on the road construction project. 
Now her sister is already married, and she is 
staying with her husband in Delhi who is 
working as a carpenter (kath mistri). The girl has 
studied up to class two. Previously, she worked 
as domestic help in different places. She had 
stayed at a house in Kathmandu for 7–8 months. 
Since the house owners did not treat her well 
and scolded her, she did not return to work after 
she came home to visit her family. Later, she 
went to Delhi to work as a domestic helper for 
another family from her village. The owners 
were very good, and she was well treated there. 
She had to clean the house, cook food, and clean 
utensils. After staying there for 2–3 years, she 
returned to her village. Then again she worked 
as housemaid with a family residing in the town 
of Butwal in Nepal. And while visiting her 
home, the supervisor of the road construction 
company was there in the village collecting 
( jamma garne) laborers. Hence, her father sent her 
to work on this construction site. Since she is 
there with her female cousins she is happy to 
work and did not think it was heavy or laborious 
work for her. She said that she would continue to 
work in construction. She gets some money from 
the supervisor for petty expenses, such as for her 
mobile phone or extra food at the site, but the 
bulk of her earnings go to her father back home. 
Although the construction sector workers 
worked for long hours, often in very poor 
working conditions, which often involved dust 
and mud, the work was not attached and many 
workers often left the work and went home or to 
other construction sites. The system of advance 
payment was limited, and they were paid 
regularly or if they wished at the end of the 
work. The recruitment was through the labor 
contractor using social networks, and laborers 
often went in groups from the same village, 
maintaining a social support network in their 
time away from the village. Often the laborers 
were collected ( jamma garne) and taken in trucks 
and tractors to the work sites, for which they did 
not have to pay, although that could be very far 
from their village where they would spend 
months before coming home or moving to 
another construction site. Construction work, 
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except for the specialized workforce, did not 
require specific skills. The manual work involved 
mixing and carrying, and people learned their 
work quickly. The payment was based on a daily 
wage and the work was often called “ jyaladari 
kaam” (wage work). Accommodation was often 
poor, made up of plastic sheets and had very little 
protection from heat, rain, or cold. The workers 
did not have access to health care and would 
spend their own earnings on health care when 
they fell ill. If they were ill and unable to work, 
there would be no pay. Because of the hard work 
for long hours in a dusty environment, illness 
was a major challenge for construction workers. 
Nepali Migrant Workers in India
While estimates vary, as many as two million 
Nepali migrants are believed to be working in 
India. Although the proportion of Nepali 
workers in India has decreased from 80 percent 
of total external migrants in 2001 to 41 percent 
in 2009,9 mainly due to the emergence of other 
migration destinations following the second 
wave of work migration from Nepal to various 
global destinations such as the Gulf States and 
East Asia, migration to India continues to remain 
an important destination for poorer households 
in the middle hills. 
Migration to India in search of work is not a new 
phenomenon. The first wave of migration began 
in 18th and 19th centuries when state policies 
and agrarian changes forced peasants in the hills 
to move out of their land and seek their 
livelihoods elsewhere, both within Nepal and 
across the border into India. Labor migration of 
young men started with the recruitment to serve 
in the army of the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh and 
then into the British Army in India. The unique 
open border between the two counties, 
formalized by the Nepal-India Peace and 
Friendship Treaty of 1950, allows the citizens of 
both countries to cross the border without 
having to produce official documents and offers 
equal treatment of both citizens. The 1950 
Treaty and the letters of exchange that followed 
the Treaty state that neither country may 
unilaterally introduce travel provisions that 
might restrict free movement of people across 
the border.
Despite such provisions, the open border is not 
quite open when seen from the perspective of 
labor migrants who cross into India. Not only do 
the migrants have to navigate the border police 
who often maltreat them, they also face threats 
from transporters and traders who often 
physically force them to travel in specific 
transport and cheat them on the prices. Migrants 
who cross the border, although initially excited, 
are disciplined and humiliated by both formal 
and informal gatekeepers as a way of producing 
low-wage earners in India. Border crossing 
featured prominently in the narratives of 
migrants we spoke to, who were often 
humiliated, cheated, and looted while crossing. 
Although the unique arrangement between 
Nepal and India allows Nepali migrants to travel 
across the border into India (and vice versa) and 
earn their livelihoods without having to produce 
any documentary evidence, it also means that a 
Nepali migrant in India is in an ambiguous 
category, neither native nor an alien. 
 
Recruitment 
Local labor contractors actively recruit seasonal 
laborers to work in road and house contruction 
in Uttarakhand and Himanchal; all the other 
forms of migration to India are organized and 
supported by kinship networks. Over the years, 
social networks and inheritance have played a 
crucial role in sustaining the migration cycle 
between the villages of origin in the western 
hills and specific destinations in India. Social 
networks remain important not only in 
organizing migration but also in finding work 
and living together in India. Migrants from 
particular places and kinship networks often live 
together, and their interaction is mainly limited 
to the kinship group. The employers or 
“owners” in India often put requests to employed 
migrants to arrange for a domestic worker or a 
chowkidar or a hotel worker for them in India, 
and migrants, when they come to visit their 
family in Nepal or during festivals, take one or 
more of their relatives or neighbors when they 
return back to India. Often the returnee migrant 
9    WB, 2011, “Large-scale Migration and Remittances in Nepal: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities,” Kathmandu, Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region, World Bank, p. 130.
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may pay for the new migrant or may loan the 
travel fare to be paid once the new migrant starts 
earning money. In several of the work settings 
such as domestic work or security guard or hotel 
worker in India, migrant workers are expected 
to find a “reliable” replacement if they are to go 
on leave to Nepal. While some migrants may sell 
the job to other new migrants, others bring their 
close relatives as a replacement. 
In a restaurant in Delhi, we found that all the 
workers were brought by the cook from his 
village. The workers were either his neighbors or 
distant relatives. Whenever there was a shortage 
of workers, the “owner” would talk to his 
workers to try and attract new migrants to come 
and work in Delhi. With limited payment and 
difficult work conditions, the employers of 
Nepali migrants were finding it difficult to 
attract Nepali migrants to come and work for 
them. Due to the labor shortage, in several work 
settings, a few workers were found to be 
working for long hours. 
Labor contractors are active in the far-western 
and mid-western hills and take with them groups 
of 20–40 workers to Himanchal or Uttarakhand 
to work in the construction sector or in apple 
orchards. This type of recruitment is seasonal 
and done by an experienced migrant himself, 
who makes a small profit by arranging workers 
who are fit to work in high altitude sites on the 
other side of the border. 
Working and Living Conditions in India
Not all Nepali migrants in India are poor or 
marginal, but most work in difficult and 
exploitative conditions. Except for some who 
work in government, police, army, or office 
work in the private sector and a few others who 
run enterprises, most Nepali migrants work in 
menial and low-paid jobs in the informal service 
sectors, domestic work, and in the 
manufacturing, construction, and agricultural 
sectors. We conducted fieldwork among those 
who work in menial and low-paid jobs in the 
informal service sector such as porters, 
construction workers, security guards, hotel and 
restaurant workers, domestic workers, and 
factory workers in Delhi and Uttarakhand. 
Except for a few family units who make momos 
(dumplings) and/or are involved in running food 
stalls selling “momo” and “Chinese food” in New 
Delhi, there is no practice of engagement in 
Photo: Sanjaya Aryal
Left: Two migrant boys from Kalikot (Nepal) working as porters and pilgrim carriers at Badrinath, Uttarakhand, 
India Right: Migrant from Kalikot carrying a pilgrim at Badrinath, Uttarakhand, India
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enterprise among Nepali migrants in India. 
Although the demand for Nepalis working as 
chowkidars (guard/watchman) and factory 
workers, which were two very popular sources 
of employment in Indian cities along with 
agriculture in rural areas, is generally declining, 
there is a steady demand for Nepali workers to 
work as hotel/restaurants workers, domestic 
workers, and manual laborers in road 
construction and as porters in different parts of 
India. Seasonal work is common in road 
construction and portering in Uttarakhand and 
Himanchal. Most migration to other parts of 
India is temporary and circular (aune-jane). 
Although a very small number of migrants take 
their families with them, most migration is 
individual in nature, leaving the family members 
back in the village to be supported by 
remittances sent from India. Except for medical 
treatment, most migrants do not take their 
family members or wives with them, not only 
because the families left behind have the 
responsibility to look after the land the care for 
the children/elderly, but also because of lack of 
accommodation and physical security in the 
destination. The practice of migration to work in 
India starts often at a young age, and many 
continue to travel back and forth until they are 
old. Once unable to work in India, old men 
retire back in their in their villages to be cared 
by their families and children. 
 
With no wife or children accompanying them as 
well as an aspiration to “save there and eat 
here,”10 migrants often end up working for long 
hours. As regular income is low to cover the 
living and travel costs at the destination, most 
must work overtime in order to make some 
savings. 
Commonly known as chowkida-r, gorkha-, or 
baha-dur, those who work as watchmen are 
employed in private bungalows, housing 
colonies, government offices, factories, hospitals, 
or businesses. Commercialization of the security 
business under multinational security companies, 
such as Group Four, means that the social 
networks that long formed the basis of a 
continuous supply of Nepali men to work as 
watchmen are slowly being replaced by formal 
procedures of recruitment. 
The working hours of watchmen are not fixed, 
and it is usual to see these men working 
overtime in set shifts, often up to 15–17 hours a 
day to earn more money to enable them to save 
and send money back to their family in Nepal. 
The monthly salary of watchmen ranges from 
anywhere between IRs 2,500 and 8,000, but 
they are able to earn more money by working 
overtime and doing other work (such as taking 
children to school, cleaning cars, shopping, and 
so on) for the residents, as well as getting 
occasional tips from the residents. During our 
fieldwork in Delhi, especially in the morning 
hours, the watchmen would be busy cleaning 
cars with a bucket of water and a wet cloth. 
Although most watchmen work long hours, it is 
not always possible for them to dramatically 
change their living conditions. A few initially 
felt that the job was difficult and boring but have 
found it easier as they got used to it. Despite the 
long working hours, the job as watchman is 
particularly important for the flexibility it 
provides to work overtime and earn more 
money. It also offers the security of shelter and 
recognition as a capable and trustworthy person. 
Watchmen are usually given a uniform and a 
long stick and a whistle, but this is not always the 
case. Dressed in a uniform, holding long sticks 
and traditionnally with a moustache, the 
watchmen move around their building, check 
cars and people entering the building, and 
demonstrate their employer’s confidence in 
them. As the owner of the building passes 
through the gate, they often display their 
obedience and discipline with a salute. The job is 
considered easier when compared to work in 
restaurants and domestic work, which require 
long hours of work, often under constant 
surveillance of employers/owners. The job also 
involves loneliness, as they spend most of their 
time standing at the gate with hardly anyone 
with whom they could talk, except the domestic 
workers staying in or visiting the building, or 
watchmen from the neighboring buildings. It is 
10    F. Watkins, 2004, “’Save There, Eat Here’: Migrants, Households and Community Identity among Pakhtuns in Northern Pakistan,” Migration, 
Modernity and Social Transformation in South Asia, F. Osella and K. Gardner, Delhi: Sage.
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almost impossible for them to get involved 
intimately with others. Working as watchmen is 
difficult when they are attacked by thieves or 
unable to catch the thieves, which results 
instantly in the loss of the job or deductions from 
their salary for a few months. Watchmen are also 
the first suspects if a flat/house is broken into in 
the colony. 
A growing but invisible workplace for the 
increasing number of young Nepali men is to 
work as helpers or domestic workers in middle-
class houses in cities like Delhi and other small 
towns in India. A small number of women also 
work as domestic workers. The work involves 
long hours, although their monthly income 
ranges from anywhere between IRs 1,500 and 
IRs 3,000. Workers are provided with meals and 
accommodation. Often invisible, except when 
they leave the home for 1–3 hours per day, those 
who work as domestic workers spend most of 
their time inside the apartment of their middle-
class employers. The job involves loneliness, as 
they spend most of their time working on their 
own, except when they get instructions from 
their employer. The owners put restrictions on 
workers spending much time outside the house. 
Domestic workers spend most of their time 
preparing and cooking food, cleaning dishes, 
cleaning the house, and washing clothes. The 
men we spoke to did not complain about their 
work, although they did not see domestic help or 
working as helpers in hotels or restaurants as a 
long-term job, and they hoped to find “better 
work” (ra-mro ka-m) in an “office” later. 
Just like domestic work, working in hotels and 
restaurants can be very difficult if not daunting 
and is often the first resort for young men who 
end up in cities like Delhi. Hotel work involves 
long hours on a fixed salary, with a starting 
salary as low as IRs 2,500 and overtime as much 
as IRs 6,000. Work involves cleaning, chopping, 
cooking, and shopping for goods. Just like 
domestic workers, the workers in restaurants are 
provided with accommodation in the same place 
where they work. There is no concept of a day 
off for those who work as domestic workers and 
for those who work in hotels/restaurants. 
In Uttarakhand and Himanchal, Nepali migrants 
worked as porters, while a few worked as daily-
wage laborers in construction sites. In hill 
stations such as Nainital, Simla, and other towns, 
it is possible to see several men carrying ‘‘ropes” 
and wearing Nepali caps, waiting to be called by 
tourists to carry their luggage. Nepali migrants, 
locally called Dotyals (literally means those from 
Doti district in Nepal but referring to Nepali 
migrants who come to Nainital from the mid-
western and far-western hills of Nepal), were 
easily identifiable by the ropes they held in their 
hand and the torn/dirty clothes they wore. The 
porters were self-employed, which gave the 
migrants flexibility in terms of working hours 
but also put them at risk if they could not find 
work for some reason (e.g., bad weather). All the 
young men we met looked very weak, fatigued, 
and overworked. 
 
The routine was regular for these men. Most of 
them shared a room and lived with other 
migrants from the same village. They cooked 
and ate together in their little shack. They 
worked for the whole day in the market, waiting 
for someone to call them for work. After 5 or 6 
pm in the evening, they went back to their little 
room, cooked food, ate, and slept.  
They earned anywhere between IRs 100–400 
per day, with an average of IRs 150–200 per day. 
Most migrants were conscientious about saving, 
although a few ended up spending hard-earned 
money on alcohol in the evening. They did not 
have bank accounts or a safe place in their room 
to keep their savings; they kept their savings 
with a few “trusted” shopkeepers for safety. The 
shopkeepers were very honest, and they got their 
money whenever they wanted, sometimes with 
some interest. On average, a migrant saved about 
IRs 20,000 in a year. 
A particular aspect of migrants’ life on days off in 
Delhi was to go sightseeing to different parts of 
the city where there were administrative 
buildings, places of tourist attractions like the 
India Gate, the President’s House, and 
occasionally to the movies. Commonly known 
as ghumna ja-ne (to wander around), this involved 
exploring new places for entertainment in 
shopping malls, market areas, or in movie 
theaters.  
Although they didn’t always have access, 
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television and the movies were popular forms of 
entertainment among the migrant men in Delhi. 
Whenever there were opportunities, young men 
often watched movies, serials, news, or cricket 
matches on television. Except for domestic 
workers, other young migrants went to see a 
movie whenever they were free. A couple of 
young men said that they never missed a newly 
released movie, and spent much of their earnings 
on movies. They had up-to-date knowledge 
about the movies, movie stars, television serials, 
and gossip. 
Although the experience of Nepali migrants in 
India is very diverse, most work in the informal 
sector. This involves long working hours under 
difficult working conditions. Often, migrants 
address their employer as “owner” (malik, or 
sahu), which signifies the nature of a relationship 
that contains feudal elements. The salary or 
income is not very high in India, and they end 
up spending quite a lot of money on travel. 
However, the work is readily available and they 
“get paid on time,” which was a major concern 
for many if they were working in Nepal, where 
payment was not prompt after completing the 
work. Nepali migrants often lived closely with 
others from Nepal, and this social network was 
important for them while working in a distant 
land. When they found it difficult to continue 
working, migrants often left work without 
waiting for any payment. Initially payment was 
always very low, and the rise in their salary was 
dependent on demonstrating their ability to 
work. Migrants often did not have to pay for 
accommodation; if not they lived together in a 
group of 4–6 and contributed about IRs 200–
400 per person per month for a room in a juggi 
(slum). 
Nepali Workers in the “Brave New World” 
of Qatar 
Qatar has a population of about 1.8 million of 
which 94 percent are migrants. Nepali migrants 
total about 400,000 and constitute the largest 
single contingent of foreign workers. The 
majority of migrants work in construction: 
hundreds of thousands of workers are needed to 
fulfill Qatar’s ambitious objectives, both 
economic and linked to the projection of its 
visibility and power. These two objectives come 
together in the enormous construction projects 
that are remodeling the city of Doha in view of 
the 2022 football World Cup.
Qatar has created a kind of genetically 
engineered society in which migrants constitute 
the expendable labor force that is functional to 
the production of the wealth and power of 
those—the small minority of Qatari families and 
the small elite of foreign managers—who rule 
from the top of the pyramid. As in Huxley’s 
dystopia, the pyramid is stratified, and because 
the various layers have different interests, there is 
little opportunity for solidarity or the expression 
of grievances across layers. Moreover, because all 
migration is temporary—a maximum of 2–3 
years, after which a 2–year break is mandatory, 
except for a small caste of managers (south 
Indians, Palestinians, nationals of other Gulf 
countries) who are allowed to stay longer—the 
Qatari state has little concern for the long-term 
stability of the pyramid. Unnecessary layers or 
groups can be easily phased out as required and 
with minimal risk to stability. Nepalis constitute 
the bottom layer: the most disadvantaged, 
exploited, and discriminated against.  
Complexity of Labor Arrangements
Migration to Qatar is based on the Kafala 
(sponsorship) system, which reflects the practices 
of control and exclusion of migrants. There are 
two types of sponsorship arrangements: 
(a)  The regulated system based on an agreement 
between the governments of Qatar and Nepal 
allows for a certain quota of Nepalis to 
migrate to Qatar each year. This involves a 
system of agents who identify potential 
migrants at the village level and manpower 
agencies in Nepal that provide a number of 
services: basic induction, health check, 
required paperwork, identification of a Kapil 
(sponsor, a Qatari national) and a Mudir 
(manager) in Qatar, a contract specifying 
work conditions and salary, provision of 
passport and ticket as well as exit permit from 
Nepal, and visa for Qatar. Typically, aspiring 
migrants are required to pay approximately 
NRs 150,000 for theses services and spend a 
variable amount of time—from a few days to 
several weeks—in guesthouses or small hotels 
in Kathmandu before receiving their 
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marching orders. Repeated visits to 
Kathmandu may be required before the 
documents are finalized. In some cases, the 
process is aborted by the manpower agency 
or the sponsor. In theory, manpower agencies 
are obliged to protect the migrant from 
excessive costs and, if contractual 
arrangements are not respected or overly 
exploitative, arrange for the return of the 
migrant, at their cost, to his/her village. In 
practice, the manpower agency is reluctant to 
do so or does so only as a last resort. Most 
migrants need to take out loans to cover the 
manpower agency fees and other expenses. 
Loan rates are usually around 36 percent/
year, sometimes up to 50 percent/year, and 
can quickly become an unsustainable burden, 
especially if things do not go as planned 
when the migrant reaches Qatar.
(b)  The so-called “free visa” system whereby a 
migrant already working in Qatar identifies a 
potential mudir and a work opportunity and 
contacts an interested potential migrant—
usually a family member or someone from 
the same village. This bypasses the 
manpower agency and is therefore much 
cheaper for the sponsor. Moreover, the 
aspiring migrants often have to pay for their 
own ticket. If the migrant leaves via India, 
the process also bypasses the quota system 
and can be faster. However, the risks for the 
migrant are greater, as the agreement is not 
recorded, and even the minimal protection 
afforded by the manpower agency is absent. 
There are many instances of migrants who 
are “invited” by a family member or friend, 
only to find that they have been tricked into 
a predicament that has no relation to the 
conditions that were promised. Because the 
mudir typically pays a fee to the migrant who 
“invites” a family member, there is an 
in-built incentive to trick the newcomer into 
coming, with ensuing painful family or 
community rifts back home.
(c)  There is also a third way: illegal entry into 
Qatar with a tourist visa. This is sometimes 
the route chosen by female migrants who 
come to work as maids and carers (Nepal no 
longer allows female migrants under 30 years 
of age to go legally to Qatar) and by young 
men who come on the odd chance that they 
will be allowed entry. The risks are high 
Left: Two Nepali restaurant workers, Doha, Qatar. Right: Migrant workers waiting for their exit permit are staying 
in a labor camp outside Doha. When workers leave their job because they find work or accommodation conditions 
unacceptable they often have to wait for months for their passport to be returned and for their exit permit.
Photo: Antonio Donini Photo: Sanjaya Aryal
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become totally dependent on their employer for 
their survival and well-being. Their interface is 
the mudir, usually a migrant himself, who 
manages the laborers on behalf of the employer 
(usually a Qatari national). Migrants are 
dependent on their mudir for everything: 
working and living conditions, payment of 
salary, ensuring their legal status (proper ID and 
visa), access to health care, as well as permission 
to change job and financing of their return ticket 
home. This set-up creates the basis for 
exploitation, which starts with the confiscation 
of the migrant’s passport upon arrival. Though 
illegal as per Qatari law, this is the norm for 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers—i.e., the vast 
majority of Nepali migrants. As one migrant put 
it, “The first thing that happens is that your identity is 
taken away from you.” The sense of bondage 
becomes apparent when, in many cases, migrants 
realize that their working conditions and salary 
are much inferior to what they were promised 
(and their contract says), that they cannot change 
their employer or their job unless the employer 
agrees to sign a release waiver, and that they 
cannot leave the country without an exit permit, 
the denial of which is used to pressure migrants 
to accept under-par conditions, etc. 
Effectively, many migrants become caught in a 
vise: they are forced to accept because 
challenging the system is difficult, costly, time-
consuming, and of uncertain outcome. Debt 
entrapment, family pressure, and the potential 
loss of face of being considered “ faltu” (useless) 
upon return to the village conspire to force 
migrants to comply. When conditions become 
abusive or unbearable, the only available option 
is to run away (which is illegal) and seek 
employment directly with another mudir (which 
is doubly illegal). The boundaries between illegal 
and licit fluctuate: for the mudir the advantage of 
recruiting a runaway is that he does not need to 
pay for health care, the renewal of the visa, and 
the cost of the return ticket if the migrant is 
caught by the police. Moreover, the risks 
incurred by the mudir are minimal, as labor laws 
protect the employers and are seldom enforced in 
favor of migrants. Such illegal arrangements are 
sought after by employers in need of greater 
numbers of workers than the “official” system 
can provide. Sometimes, despite the obvious 
risks of deportation and lack of access to services, 
because entering on a tourist visa requires 
evidence of a return ticket and sufficient cash 
as well as a contact address in Qatar. Those 
who enter illegally tend to have a precarious 
existence, can be subjected to physical 
violence by their employers, and face 
immediate deportation if caught by the 
police.
Few Nepali skilled laborers make it to Qatar; the 
vast majority are unskilled and work in 
construction and agriculture. The few semi-
skilled laborers work as taxi drivers or hotel 
workers. Ninety percent of Nepali migrants are 
male; a few women work as carers or domestic 
servants. Because of the costs involved for travel, 
fees to the manpower agencies, passport issuance, 
buying a suitcase, clothes, and other items before 
departure, most Nepalis have to take out loans 
from village moneylenders (at rates of 3 percent 
interest/month or even more) or from their 
family. Recruitment is through a network of 
Nepali brokers and Qatar-based sponsors. Unlike 
migration to India, kinship and social networks 
play a minimal role: recruitment is for 
individuals or small groups who are rarely from 
the same area or village (the exception is when 
migrants are “called” via the “free visa” scheme 
where kinship networks are the main vehicle).
Exploitation
Push and pull factors combine in the decision to 
migrate: poverty, the structural violence of the 
caste system and semi-feudal labor arrangements 
in the agricultural sector, family pressure (real or 
presumed), the aspiration for change and a better 
life, on one side, and the role of agents who 
scour the countryside looking for potential 
migrants, on the other. Many aspiring migrants 
have heard both positive and negative stories of 
“what happens.” A few, particularly the semi-
literate youths from remote areas, are—or seem 
to be—genuinely ignorant of the exploitative 
conditions they are likely to find. Overall, the 
lure is very strong, and aspiring migrants tend to 
brush aside the risks or block them from their 
minds and hope for the best.
Whether the overall experience is a positive one 
or not, there is a widespread sense among 
migrants of “being owned.” Once they step out 
of the Doha International Airport, migrants 
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such arrangements can work to the advantage of 
the migrant, as the relationship is more freely 
entered into than the sponsorship system and pay 
can be moderately higher. Less bondage, but 
more insecurity.  
Generally speaking, larger employers—and 
especially the huge construction companies that 
are part-owned by reputable international 
companies—provide more predictable and 
decent working and living conditions than the 
small employers. Some of the worst forms of 
exploitation occur for migrants who are 
recruited by service companies (i.e, companies 
that provide unskilled labor to larger companies), 
as the demand for workers fluctuates and the 
service company is often unwilling or unable to 
pay salary on time or invest in proper living 
quarters for its workers.
Grievances
Because of the weakness of the Nepali state’s 
negotiating position, compared to other more 
“organized” states such as India or the 
Philippines, the Nepal-Qatar migration 
framework agreement results in low protection 
and high exploitation of Nepali migrants. As 
mentioned, sponsorship agreements are often 
arbitrary and constitute a modern version of 
bonded labor, if not slavery. In our interviews we 
were confronted with a catalogue of grievances 
and only very few instances of relatively 
acceptable conditions. The most common issues 
mentioned were:
	 •	 	Working	conditions	and	salary	do	not	
correspond to the written contract and late 
payment of salary (sometimes months in 
arrears). Just one example: a security guard 
who was promised 1,200 riyal/month + food 
allowance for 8 hours work/day but received 
only 1,000 riyal, no food, and was forced to 
work 12 hours/day.11 
	 •	 	Withholding	of	the	exit	permit	by	the	mudir 
as a way of pressuring the migrant to stay.
	 •	 	Refusal	by	the	mudir to process the annual 
visa extension (which by law is the 
responsibility of the employer). Employers 
find this costly (1,200 riyal per worker/year), 
but without a valid visa migrants cannot 
obtain an ID card, access to health care, and 
exit permit.
	 •	 	Lack	of	dignity	and	respect	in	the	workplace	
but also vis-à-vis Qatari authorities (and the 
Nepali embassy).
	 •	 	Impossibility	to	change	employer	without	
the mudir’s agreement.
	 •	 	Accommodation	provided	by	the	sponsor	is	
very often sub-par, overcrowded (up to 
10–14 migrants in one room), or unhygienic. 
The sponsor is the key vehicle for obtaining legal 
ID and health care cards, which can be withheld 
in order to force the migrant to comply. The 
expression of grievances is met with threats to 
withdraw the ID cards or even the sponsorship 
(without the agreement of the sponsor, and the 
identification of a new one, it is not possible to 
change jobs). In theory, workers who are 
dissatisfied with their jobs have the option of 
asking the Nepali manpower agency to be 
repatriated within three months of their arrival 
(at the manpower agency’s expense), but this is 
difficult for a number of reasons: reluctance of 
the manpower agency to cover the costs, 
withholding by the sponsor of papers necessary 
for obtaining an exit permit, and reluctance of 
individual migrants to return home and face the 
loss of face and the onerous debt repayment, etc. 
As a result, many migrants run away. According 
to one source, there may be up to 20,000 to 
30,000 Nepali “escapees” who lack legal 
documents and have either found alternative 
employment illegally or are living under the 
radar with meager support from former 
coworkers or Nepali charity associations.
In our fieldwork we collected several life stories 
of migrants that illustrate the patterns of 
exploitation and, paradoxically, the continuing 
allure and prestige associated with migration to 
Qatar.
11    This gentleman was particularly vocal in his animosity for the manpower agency in Kathmandu that had recruited him: “I am a former army 
person. I have fought the insurgency and killed people.  When I go back I will kill three more: the lady at the manpower agency and her two bosses.” He 
had taken out a Rs 60,000 loan that he was unable to pay back in full. The interest was 36 percent per year. “It would have been better for me 
to stay home and raise buffaloes.”
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Every day, dozens of migrants show up at the 
embassy (which is located very far from the 
center of Doha in an area with no public 
transport) to bring their complaints to the 
overworked staff. Up to 20–30 migrants with 
nowhere else to go camp out at the embassy at 
night. As there is no other space, they roll out 
some bedding in the offices when the staff have 
left. Unlike other embassies, Nepal has no hostel 
facilities. For example, the Philippines embassy 
has a large hostel for women migrants.
Resistance
In our findings, Nepali migrants in Qatar are 
neither passive victims regularly facing abuse and 
exploitation nor successful migrants who have 
been able to take control of their lives. 
Experiences run the range from the relatively 
successful to the abominable. Not all mudirs are 
abusive or insensitive to the human condition of 
migrants. However, the collective identity of 
Nepalis in Qatar is one of exploitation, 
discrimination, and loss of dignity. How do 
migrants cope with this situation? Membership 
in trade unions is not possible for migrants 
(though Qatari trade unions exist and participate 
in the ILO tripartite structures), but a variety of 
small self-help groups set up by migrants 
themselves or by the Non-resident Nepali 
Association (NRNA) provide some services, 
including cash subsidies in extreme cases and 
assistance in repatriation etc. We have 
nevertheless been able to document some of the 
everyday forms of resistance. Just as the forms of 
structural violence these migrants face are subtle 
although powerful, resistance occurs in the same 
discreet pattern on an everyday basis (for 
example: “work to rule” or deliberate slow-
down, absenteeism, unofficial work stoppages, 
etc.).  
Strikes are illegal in Qatar, but this does not 
mean that they don’t happen. A major 
multinational construction company was obliged 
to address worker grievances after a series of 
unofficial strikes in 2006. Similarly, the main 
taxi company in Qatar, in which many Nepalis 
work, had to substantially improve salary and 
working conditions after a strike in 2011. Qatar 
needs the foreign labor and is mindful of its 
image: strikes and the visible expulsion of 
workers do not play well with this image. The 
Recourse/Redress 
When migrants seek redress for exploitative 
conditions, the odds are stacked against them. 
The expression of grievances or complaints is 
ignored or met with hostility. Instances of 
workers simply being kicked out by their 
employer for protesting against working or living 
conditions abound. We met several workers who 
were in such limbo—no job, no money, no exit 
permit. A typical case: we met three twenty-
year-olds from Langtang, recently arrived, who 
had complained about their salary and 
accommodation conditions and who had been 
thrown out by their mudir. They were camping 
on the roof of a derelict, overcrowded hostel, 
sleeping among refuse and surviving on the 
charity of some of the hostel residents and some 
canned food and supplies provided by a Nepali 
informal support group. Their only hope was the 
intervention of the Nepali embassy, which is 
poorly equipped for the task and in poor 
standing vis-à-vis the Qatari authorities.
In theory, complaints can be addressed by 
migrants to the Qatar labor department, but the 
decisions of the department are often ignored by 
the mudirs, who often do not bother to show up 
when summoned. Complainants can also go to 
the courts, but this is expensive, can take 
months, and is of uncertain outcome. Moreover, 
there is no guarantee that the mudir will comply 
with the decisions of the court.
The only other avenue of redress is via the 
Nepali embassy, but it is understaffed if not 
under-committed, and its leverage with the 
authorities is minimal. Practically, the labor 
attaché can call the mudir and plead for the 
problem—usually salary payment or exit permit 
issues—to be resolved or invite the mudir to 
come to the embassy for a meeting. As he is 
under no obligation to comply, this often fails. In 
more serious cases, the embassy writes to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as by law it cannot 
contact the labor department directly, to request 
an interview with the department. This can take 
months to arrange, and the outcome is by no 
means certain. Eventually, problems get solved 
when the department releases an exit permit—or 
when a migrant without proper papers is caught 
by the police and deported.
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fact remains, however, that the protection 
afforded by worker organizations is minimal. 
Actions to confront the system are risky, and, 
because of the layered structure of the migrants’ 
pyramid, the disparate concerns and grievances 
of the various layers often do not add up. It is 
easy for employers to “play” one group or 
nationality against another, and Nepalis are 
considered by the employers, and by their 
co-workers of a different nationality, as the 
bottom rung of the pyramid. This also explains 
why Nepalis are a sought-after nationality: they 
are paid less, complain less, and are seen as 
hard-working and compliant.
Masculinity
Ninety percent of Nepali migrants in Qatar are 
male. They are also relatively young, in their 
twenties, especially the new arrivals who are 
more subject to exploitation. Older migrants are 
usually returnee migrants who have achieved 
improved conditions and some respectability. 
Some especially successful migrants, earning 
good money, and who have become mudirs have 
been allowed to bring their families and have 
long-term visas. But by and large, migration to 
Qatar for Nepalis is a young and male affair, 
which entails considerable emotional suffering 
(and, presumably, repressed sexuality). Many 
have left young wives and kids back in their 
village; others are facing debt entrapment, which 
precludes them from getting married.  
Avenues for socializing among the sexes are 
extraordinarily limited. Nepali female migrants 
are either working as maids or as carers, and 
some are salespersons. Usually their mobility is 
constrained by tight controls from employers. 
Male migrants are slightly more free to move 
around town and tend to congregate on Fridays 
in a couple of squares or in Nepali restaurants. 
Moreover, on Fridays access to parks and beaches 
is reserved for families and women. Men without 
accompanying spouse or children/family 
members are chased away (as the authors of this 
report can attest). This further complicates 
potential interactions between the sexes. 
Language and perceived discrimination preclude 
contact with female migrants of other 
nationalities (the Filipino female contingent is 
quite considerable) and of course with Qatari 
women.12 We did not look into how these 
frustrations are managed, but we did hear several 
references to substance abuse: as liquor is not 
available publicly, some migrants consume 
pesticides or low-quality black market liquor, 
and many take it regularly.
12    Although we did hear of one case of the daughter of an employer falling in love with a Nepali worker. The mudir tried to get the 
worker expelled, but this was resisted by the young woman and her father. In the end, the relationship soured because the young 
woman wanted her future husband to convert to Islam.
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not always, end up working as domestic workers 
or care givers, migration has paradoxically 
offered both freedom and unfreedom. 
Embarking on a journey to paid employment has 
certainly offered opportunities for income to 
women who otherwise are largely excluded from 
participation in the labor market. This has 
challenged the stereotypical representation of 
women as unproductive and contributed to 
financial gains and empowerment for women. 
However, the nature of domestic work reinforces 
gendered ideas of work, and their status as alien 
female domestic workers (from Nepal) makes 
women vulnerable to downward social mobility, 
discrimination, abuse, and exploitation. For men 
in destinations such as Qatar, while there are 
opportunities for increased income, these are 
erratic and do not necessarily lead to upward 
mobility. In addition, masculinity issues arise not 
only in an all-male environment away from 
family where sexuality is highly constrained but 
also in work that involves bodily harm, fatigue, 
social dislocation, and debt entrapment. While 
increasing numbers of men seek to assert their 
masculinity through migration, both in the form 
of earnings and wider experience beyond village 
life, migration does not automatically translate 
into affirmation of identity, as many migrants 
struggle to save money and end up working in 
difficult environments that offer very little 
possibility for social mobility. 
Labor Organization
Labor arrangements are made through informal 
channels and are under-regulated, i.e., 
recruitment, organization of working and living 
conditions, and remuneration take place in the 
absence of formal regulation. Much of the 
migration occurs through existing or traditional 
or patronage-based social networks, both in 
terms of recruitment as well as in the financing 
of migration, and there is a widespread use of a 
chain of largely informal brokers/mediators/
contractors who are under-regulated. The formal 
mechanisms, such as banking or recruitment 
agencies, have not replaced the traditional 
practices of providing loans and facilitating 
migration. In fact, the formal depends on the 
traditional systems. Rather than to the employer, 
While there are significant differences in the 
experiences of individual migrants who end up 
in different destinations and work settings, we 
can come up with a few broad themes. 
Class and Gender
One of the key features of the identity of 
migrants is their marginality as members of low 
or background communities who belong to the 
poorer sections of rural society. Their decisions 
to move out of their villages in search of 
livelihoods is not only due to lack of physical and 
material capital but also to lack of social and 
cultural capital. In the absence of social, cultural, 
economic, and political capital, they are located 
at the bottom of the social hierarchy not only in 
their place of origin but also in the destination. 
Their mobility highlights an apparent 
contradiction and their liminal position: they 
leave the villages because of their redundancy in 
the rural-agrarian labor processes as well as 
because of the attraction that modernity has to 
offer in the cities and towns, but they are 
constantly driven back to their village because of 
the transient and time-bound nature of their 
mobility. While there is demand for labor in 
their villages and in the cities and towns, it is 
temporary, and they are hired only for short 
periods of time when there is a peak demand or 
until they are unable to continue to work for 
family, health, or other reasons. Their mobility is 
work related, and depending on the work 
available, they may bring their family (e.g., in 
the brick kilns) or may leave their family behind 
(e.g., in India, or in the Gulf, or in other sectors 
of work within Nepal). 
Labor migration from rural Nepal is both classed 
and gendered. Not only do class positions and 
gender ideas shape migration patterns and work 
experiences, they also contribute to reproduce 
gendered and class hierarchies. The poor and 
unskilled end up migrating to work in sectors of 
the economy such as construction work, brick 
kilns, domestic work, or informal service sector 
work within Nepal and India that offer very 
little possibility of social mobility, as exploitative 
structures prevail both in the recruitment and 
the work processes. For women who often, but 
III. KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
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migrants are tied to recruiters. It is the practice 
of recruitment of labor using brokers, who act on 
behalf of employers, that shapes the process of 
labor circulation, rather than the demand and 
supply of labor, as an economic argument might 
suggest. There is little or no possibility for 
recourse or redress once exploitative 
arrangements are entered into. Informal 
organizations of workers, trade unions, and the 
role of kinship and NGOs afford some 
protection. In some cases (carpet factories), they 
have mitigated the most obvious forms of 
exploitation, but because most migrant labor is 
highly segmented, as in the service and domestic 
labor sectors, workers’ organization is difficult if 
not impossible, and often dangerous.
Ideas of Modernity and Freedom
Out-migration from rural Nepal is often 
associated with ideas of modernity, freedom, the 
escape from a regimented gender order and from 
the village life, and is seen as a way to achieve a 
certain idea of personal autonomy through cash 
income (kamaune), travel, adventure, and 
consumption in the cities and towns. Positive 
meanings of migration are attached to “being 
modern” or avoid being “ faltu.” While the risks 
are well known, they are played down or 
ignored. Many of those who migrate in search of 
modernity in cities and towns end up working in 
environments that keep them segregated from 
the rest of the population in the destination, with 
very little opportunity to participate in the world 
of modernity and freedom. Thus, the very idea 
of migration, as well as the working and living 
conditions, often result in restrictions on 
freedom and encourage self-exploitation. In their 
drive to earn money and participate in 
consumption, migrants are under constant 
pressure to work long hours and often in difficult 
working conditions that result in harm and 
exploitation. 
Among the characteristics of migration we 
highlight the invisibility and seasonality of labor, 
and the structural violence and social suffering 
that accompanies it. Labor is often subjected to 
both visible and invisible forms of discipline and 
whimsical treatment, including discrimination 
and humiliation. This is often accompanied by 
forced compliance with arbitrary norms, if not 
the stripping of the migrant’s identity. The 
confiscation of the migrant worker’s passport on 
arrival in the Gulf (and the impossibility of 
obtaining an exit permit without the agreement 
of the employer) is highly symbolic of the status 
of unfreedom, as is the ubiquitous humiliation of 
migrant workers at the Nepal-India border, or 
the self-exploitation of workers in brick kilns in 
Kathmandu. Although freedom drives mobility, 
mobility does not mean freedom. The 
commodification of labor has not been a source 
of emancipation. What we have is the persistence 
of structural violence and semi-feudal 
exploitation in a highly globalized context. This 
amounts to a kind of post-modernist feudalism. 
In this sense, commodification does not replace 
unfreedom, but thrives on it. Unfree labor is 
alive and well in Qatar (the world’s highest GDP 
per capita—but only for Qataris, not for the 
migrant workers) and in various sectors of the 
economy in Kathmandu or in India where 
Nepalis work. Modernity and slavery coexist and 
support each other. In the hyper-globalized, 
genetically re-engineered society of Qatar, these 
unfreedoms are functional to the economic 
strategies of the state. 
Resistance 
While exploitation and suffering are widespread, 
migrants we spoke to did not resort to organized 
or collective forms of resistance. Throughout our 
fieldwork, we were surprised by how little our 
informants explicitly questioned the many 
inequalities they experienced. Resistance is 
limited to “weapons of the weak,”13 which help 
to mitigate suffering but are poorly understood. 
For example, in Qatar, trade unions (for 
migrants) and strikes are banned but unofficial 
strikes, work-to-rule, absenteeism, etc. occur 
regularly. Migrants in the brick kilns or domestic 
workers may run away, or construction workers 
13    James C. Scott, 1985, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale University Press.
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do not turn up on time. Apart from these, 
migrant workers have accepted the work 
processes and recruitment practices that often 
exploit them. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic violence helps us explain why these 
inequalities have become routinely unquestioned 
and unchallenged by migrant workers. As 
Bourdieu argues, symbolic violence is the 
naturalization, including internalization, of 
social asymmetries. He explains that we perceive 
the social world through lenses issued forth from 
that very social world; thus we recognize (or 
“misrecognize”) the social order as natural. The 
inequalities comprising the social world are thus 
made invisible, taken-for-granted, and normal 
for all involved. This helps us to understand the 
exploitation, if not the self-exploitation, that 
Nepali migrants are subjected to.
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The exodus of labor from agriculture and the 
countryside has now become a regular 
phenomenon in Nepal. The opening up of the 
countryside to the outside world and the 
availability of roads and exposure to other forms 
of modernity has accelerated labor mobility on a 
larger scale than ever before. Cities, towns, and 
roadside bazars have grown; this has not been 
accompanied by a rapid expansion in industrial 
or other forms of regular employment. The 
migrants who end up in the cities, towns, and 
other destinations find a niche in the informal 
service sector. Their work is characterized by 
low pay, piece-rate payment, unskilled or 
under-skilled work, intermittent work, and no 
written contract or social protection. 
Our findings suggest that a large number of men 
and women who leave their villages do not 
actually arrive and become “urban” in the cities 
and towns: their mobility is circulatory in nature. 
They return to their villages or move to another 
place when their contract is over or when they are 
no longer required. In this sense, labor migration 
is actually labor circulation. Those who move out 
of the village do not give up their residence there. 
They remain embedded in their village of origin 
through repeated visits and keeping up with 
village social networks. This is because they are 
accepted in the urban centers as temporary 
workers and keep up ties with the village as 
insurance if they fail to find other work. Also, for 
many, the dependent members of the family are 
left back home and need to be supported by 
remitting the savings they are able to make. 
Migrants hardly have an opportunity to find a 
niche for upward social mobility in the destination 
and change their work frequently or return back 
to the village once they run out of work. One of 
the paradoxes of Nepali migration amongst the 
poorer population is that the identity of the 
migrant remains attached to the village even if the 
working sites and sectors are “modern” and urban. 
For the marginal migrants, the circulatory nature 
of migration does not appear to be as 
transformative as might have been expected: 
while life in the destination may well be urban 
and modern, their identity remains rural, or at 
best “rurban.”
Overall, while the idea of freedom away from 
the regimented and constrained life in the village 
has been driving much of out-migration from 
rural Nepal, our findings suggest that mobility of 
labor has not necessarily meant more freedom for 
poorer migrants. The attached forms of labor 
that were embedded in social relationships, caste, 
and patronage are now replaced with time-
bound, economic, flexible, and self-exploitative 
forms, without minimum social and economic 
protection. Escaping the ties of bondage and 
attachment has certainly led to optimism and 
some positive outcomes in terms of freedom to 
move. However, migration can also be an 
integral part of unfree labor, as it is often the 
process through which the worker is transferred 
from point of supply to point of demand. 
Debt, borrowing from both traditional as well as 
modern institutions, is an important means 
through which many migrants seek to secure 
their future freedoms. Migrants consent to enter 
into relations of debt that entail very heavy 
restrictions on their freedom.
While migration has certainly opened up 
opportunities for cash income, the nature of 
work and working conditions have often resulted 
in social dislocation, humiliation, debt 
entrapment, social suffering, and structural 
violence. Migrants, however, despite known 
risks, appear to provide “consent” to work in 
exploitative working conditions. Resistance is 
limited to individual, everyday forms of 
resistance that help to mitigate suffering but 
which require further research to be better 
understood. We argue that the very gap between 
the recruitment of labor that is diffused and the 
weak central regulatory mechanism that is 
limited to issuing of the passport and “labor 
sticker” makes it easier for the exploitation of 
labor to occur.  
The absence of the state compounds the 
exploitation. The state simultaneously benefits 
from migration (through remittances, and 
because migration acts as a safety valve that 
reduces social tension) but takes little 
responsibility for its regulation, other than in the 
IV. CONCLUSION
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most extreme cases of exploitation that appear in 
the media or the public sphere. Kinship, district, 
and Nepali migrant NGOs provide limited 
protection and some sense of belonging. 
International regulatory mechanisms are equally 
ineffective and provide an avenue for limited 
advocacy at best.
While Nepal has witnessed a significant increase 
in the mobility of labor from rural areas to cities 
and towns, much of which is circulatory in 
nature, this has not resulted in the 
transformation in the livelihoods of the laboring 
population. Most of the poor population who 
circulate between the rural areas and urban 
centers do not have access to social protection 
mechanisms, which contributes to their increased 
vulnerability. In many cases, the aspiration to 
escape the strictures of caste-based or bonded 
labor arrangements and to engage with 
modernity actually results in a transition from 
traditional to modern and globalized forms of 
semi-feudal exploitation and self-exploitation 
without any protection.
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ANNEX I: INTERVIEW DATA
Fieldwork in Kathmandu:
Brick kilns  21 (16 male, 5 female) 
Carpet factories  4 (male)
Garment factory  4 (3 male, 1 female)
Construction workers  14 (10 male, 4 female)
Domestic workers  9 (female)
Gulf and Malaysia aspiring migrants  30 (17 male, 13 female)
Fieldwork in Helambu, Sindhupalchowk: 
Interviews with  11 (8 male, 3 female)
Fieldwork in Nepalgunj and surrounding area:
Interviews with  12 (9 male, 3 female)
Fieldwork in Salyan (brick kiln workers’ village):
Interviews with  20 (12 male, 8 female)
Fieldwork in Dhangadhi:
Interviews with  3 (male)
Fieldwork in Uttarakhand, India:
Interviews travelling from border to Uttarakhand  7 (male)
Interviews with migrant laborers in Uttarakhand  15 (14 male, 1 female)
Fieldwork in Qatar: 31 (29 male, 2 female)
Fieldwork in New Delhi: 27 (26 male, 1 female)
TOTAL 208
ANNEX II: PROFILE OF INTERVIEW SITES
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Sector Demographics  Cost  Recruitment Work processes System of payment Working/living conditions Nature of structural violence
Within Nepal
Brick Kiln  Male/female/  NRs 500–1,000, Naike Physical labor, semi-skilled, Advance payment, Long working hours, Self-exploitation, unfair pay,
 children, rural,  one-way fare paid  unfree to leave, half-day ongoing expenses, on-site very basic advance payment, and bondage
 relatively poorer by employer  off on weekly basis, seasonal  piece rate per thousand accommodation  
Domestic  Female/children,  NRs 1,000,  Self, social Unskilled, household chores, Cash or kind on monthly Long working hours, Humiliation,
 rural, relatively  arranged by networks unfree to leave, longer-term or annual basis, access on-site accommodation maltreatment, abuse
 poorer  employer  involvement to school    
Construction  Male/female/ NRs 1,000, Naike, self Physical labor, semi-skilled/ Daily wage on weekly 8–10 hours of work, Self-exploitation, poor pay
 children, rural,  arranged by  unskilled, free to leave, basis or longer rented shared
 relatively poorer  migrant  seasonal  accommodation or on-site 
Carpet  Male/female/ NRs 1,000, Naike Physical labor, semi-skilled, Advance payment, 10–14 hours of work, Self-exploitation, poor pay
 children, rural,  arranged by  unfree to leave, monthly salary or on-site communal
 relatively poorer migrant  half-day off weekly  piece rate accommodation 
Outside of Nepal
Construction  Male, rural and NRs 120,000 Recruitment Unskilled or semi-skilled, Monthly salary 8–10 hours of work, Poor pay & working conditions, 
(Gulf) small towns,  for travel, visa, agency, dalal, unfree to leave, one day  communal housing heat, debt, sexuality constrained,
 not the poorest arranged by  (middleman), off on weekly basis,  provided (often poor quality) discrimination, deceit
  migrant, loan  kinship contract for 2–3 years
Service Sector  Male and female, NRs 120,000 Recruitment Unskilled, semi-skilled, Monthly salary 8–10 hours of work, Poor pay & working conditions,
(Gulf) rural and small  for travel,  agency, few skilled, unfree to  communal housing provided debt trap, sexuality constrained,
 towns, not the  visa, paid by dalal, kinship leave, half- or one day   discrimination, deceit
 poorest migrant, loan  off on weekly basis, 
    contract 2–3 years
Domestic Female and a  NRs 120,000 Recruitment Unskilled, household Monthly salary Extremely long working day, Poor pay & working conditions,
(Gulf) few male, not  for travel,  agency, dalal,  chores, unfree to  on-site accommodation debt trap, risk of physical/sexual
 the poorest visa, paid by  kinship leave, contract   abuse
  migrant, loan  for two years
continued on next page
   
Sector Demographics  Cost  Recruitment Work processes System of payment Working/living conditions Nature of structural violence
Agriculture  Male, poorer NRs 120,000 Recruitment Unskilled, physical labor, Monthly salary 8–10 hours of work, Poor pay & working conditions,
(Gulf)  for travel, visa,  agency, dalal,  unfree to leave, a day  on-site accommodation extreme heat, debt trap, sexuality
  arranged by  kinship off on monthly basis,   constrained
  migrant, loan  contract for two years 
Domestic  Male and female,  IRs 1,000–2,000 Kinship Unskilled, household chores, Monthly salary 10–14 hours of work, Poor pay, abuse, humiliation,
(India) poorest, from hills for travel  free to leave  on-site accommodation maltreatment, discrimination
Service Sector  Male, poorer,  IRs 1,000–2,000 Kinship Unskilled, semi-skilled Monthly salary 8–10 hours of work, Poor pay, discrimination
(India) from hills for travel  or skilled, free to leave  rented communal 
      accommodation
Construction  Male, poorest IRs 1,000–2,000 Kinship Unskilled, free to leave, Daily wage,  10–12 hours of work, Long working hours, 
(India) from hills for travel  seasonal advance payment on-sited tented poor pay, 
      accommodation discrimination
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ANNEX III: BASIC PROFILE OF NEPALI MIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS
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Name Sudur Paschim  Nepali Samaj Pravash Nepali Help Nepali Lumbini Gautam Shree Pashupati Newar Samaj
 Sampark Manch Sewa Samiti, Jan Kalyan  Mission Buddha Charitable Sampark Manch
  Delhi Samiti  Trust  
Scope India India India India India India India
Established 2004 2010 2005 2010 2010 2007 1995
Registered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliation None None None None None None None
Members 350 250 80 40 50 — —  
President Bir Bahadur Bohora Ghanshyam Sharma Omkar Sharma Kavi Karki Deepak GC Tulasi Dhakal Yam Bahadur Shrestha, 
Major  Social and cultural Social and cultural Social and cultural Social and cultural Social and cultural Social and cultural Social and cultural 
Activities programs programs programs programs programs programs programs  
Other Invited artists/singers  Organized HIV awareness Organized Teej program Rescued trafficked Dance/song performance; Organized cultural Celebration of festivals;
 from Nepal; organized  programs, sports events in 2011; received support Nepali women and free medical camp programs; supported composed of both Nepali
 health camps in Nepal;   from Nepali embassy minors also organized; received children schooling;  and Indian Newars
 sent solidarity letter to     support from Nepali blood donation
 Akhand Sudur Paschim     embassy program; distributed
 movement      blankets
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ANNEX IV: BASIC PROFILE OF NEPALI MIGRANT POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
Name  Nepali Jan  Pravashi Nepali Mulpravah Akhil Akhil Bhrat Akhil Bhrat Nepali Ekata
 Sampark Samiti  Sangh Bharat Bhrarat Nepal Nepal Ekata Nepal Ekata Samaj Bharat
 Bharat  Ekata Samaj Manch Manch   
Scope All over India All over India All over India All over India All over India All over India
Established 1967 1966 1979 2009 2012 2011
Registered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Affiliation Nepali Congress CPN (UML) CPN (Masal) UCPN (Maoist) UCPN (Maoist Vaidya faction) CPN (United)
Office Mumbai, Delhi (rent) Faridabad, Haryana (own) Badarpur, New Delhi (own) Shalimar Bagh,   Palpali Camp, Okhala,
    New Delhi (rent) — New Delhi 
Total  22,000 9,000 50,000 60,000 — —
Members      
President Bal Krishna Pandey Khem C. Dhakal Durga KC T. P. Pathak Laxman Pant Rishi Pun
Major  Political, festivals, sports Political, festivals Political, festivals, sports Political, festivals, sports  Political Political, festivals, sports
Activities       
Other 13 state committees 13 state and 109 city  10 state-level committees Banned in India in 2002, Just split Split from Mulpravah
  committees  but functioned as Nepali   on the issue of ethnicity
    Jana Adhikar Suraksha Samiti
 
  
CPN: Communist Party of Nepal
UML: United Marxist-Leninist Party
UCPN: United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
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